in his own capacity, he was still sensible that his juniors in rank might be just as able.  His supervision was constant, but his interference rare; and it was not till some palpable mistake had been committed that he assumed direct control of his divisions or brigades.  Nor was any peculiar skill needed to beat back the attack of Fremont.  Nothing proves the Federal leader’s want of confidence more clearly than the tale of losses.  The Confederate casualties amounted to 288, of which nearly half occurred in Trimble’s counterstroke.  The Federal reports show 684 killed, wounded, and missing, and of these Trimble’s riflemen accounted for nearly 500, one regiment, the 8th New York, being almost annihilated; but such losses, although at one point severe, were altogether insignificant when compared with the total strength; and it was not the troops who were defeated but the general.* (* The Confederates at Kernstown lost 20 per cent.; the Federals at Port Republic 18 per cent.  At Manassas the Stonewall Brigade lost 16 per cent., at Cross Keys Ewell only lost 8 per cent. and Fremont 5 per cent.)

Ewell’s division bivouacked within sight of the enemy’s watch-fires, and within hearing of his outposts; and throughout the night the work of removing the wounded, friend and foe alike, went on in the sombre woods.  There was work, too, at Port Republic.  Jackson, while his men slept, was all activity.  His plans were succeeding admirably.  From Fremont, cowering on the defensive before inferior numbers, there was little to be feared.  It was unlikely that after his repulse he would be found more enterprising on the morrow; a small force would be sufficient to arrest his march until Shields had been crushed; and then, swinging back across the Shenandoah, the soldiers of the Valley would find ample compensation, in the rout of their most powerful foe, for the enforced rapidity of their retreat from Winchester.  But to fight two battles in one day, to disappear completely from Fremont’s ken, and to recross the rivers before he had time to seize the bridge, were manoeuvres of the utmost delicacy, and needed most careful preparation.

It was Jackson’s custom, whenever a subordinate was to be entrusted with an independent mission, to explain the part that he was to play in a personal interview.  By such means he made certain, first, that his instructions were thoroughly understood; and, second, that there was no chance of their purport coming to the knowledge of the enemy.  Ewell was first summoned to headquarters, and then Patton, whose brigade, together with that of Trimble, was to have the task of checking Fremont the next day.  “I found him at 2 A.M.,” says Patton, “actively engaged in making his dispositions for battle.  He immediately proceeded to give me particular instructions as to the management of the men in covering the rear, saying:  “I wish you to throw out all your men, if necessary, as skirmishers, and to make a great show, so as to cause the enemy to think the whole army are behind you.  Hold your position as well as you can, then fall back when obliged; take a new position, hold it in the same way, and I will be back to join you in the morning."”