his abrupt manner:  “Colonel, how many men had you killed?” “None, I am glad to say, General.”  “How many wounded?” “Few or none, sir.”  “Do you call that fighting, sir?” said Jackson, and immediately placed him under arrest, from which he was not released for several months.) Banks, impressed by the long array of bayonets that had crowned the ridge at Winchester, rated them at 20,000 infantry, with cavalry and artillery in addition.  Geary, who had retired in hot haste from Rectortown, burning his tents and stores, had learned, he reported, from numerous sources that 10,000 cavalry were passing through Manassas Gap.  There were constant rumours that strong reinforcements were coming up from Richmond, and even McDowell believed that the army of invasion consisted of 25,000 to 30,000 men.  Fremont’s scouts, as he approached Strasburg, represented the Confederate force at 30,000 to 60,000.  Shields, before he crossed the Blue Ridge and found himself in the vicinity of his old opponent, had condemned the panic that had seized his brother generals, and had told McDowell that he would clear the Valley with his own division.  But when he reached Front Royal the force that he had scornfully described as insignificant had swelled to 20,000 men.  Troops from Richmond, he telegraphed, were marching down the Luray Valley; and he urged that he should be at once supported by two divisions.  It cannot be said that Lincoln and Stanton were to blame for the indecision of the generals.  They had urged Fremont forward to Strasburg, and Shields to Front Royal.  They had informed them, by the telegraph, of each other’s situation, and had passed on such intelligence of the enemy’s movements as had been acquired at Harper’s Ferry; and yet, although the information was sufficiently exact, both Shields and Fremont, just as Jackson anticipated, held back at the decisive moment.  The waters had been held back, and the Confederates had passed through them dry-shod.  Such is the effect of uncertainty in war; a mighty power in the hands of a general who understands its scope.

June 1.

On the morning of June 1, Jackson’s only remaining anxiety was to bring Winder back, and to expedite the retreat of the convoy.  Ewell was therefore ordered to support Ashby, and to hold Fremont in check until the Stonewall Brigade had passed through Strasburg.  The task was easily accomplished.  At seven in the morning the Confederate pickets were driven in.  As they fell back on their supports, the batteries on both sides came rapidly into action, and the Federal infantry pressed forward.  But musketry replied to musketry, and finding the road blocked by a line of riflemen, Fremont ordered his troops to occupy a defensive position on Cedar Creek.  “I was entirely ignorant,” he says, “of what had taken place in the Valley beyond, and it was now evident that Jackson, in superior force, was at or near Strasburg.”  His men, also, appear to have caught the spirit of irresolution, for a forward