May 29.

The next morning, therefore, the main body of the army marched back to Winchester; Winder, with the Stonewall Brigade and two batteries, remaining before Harper’s Ferry to hold Saxton in check.  Jackson himself returned to Winchester by the railway, and on the way he was met by untoward news.  As the train neared Winchester a staff officer, riding at a gallop across the fields, signalled it to stop, and the general was informed that the 12th Georgia had been driven from Front Royal, burning the stores, but not the bridges, at Front Royal, and that Shields’ division was in possession of the village.

The situation had suddenly become more than critical.  Front Royal is but twelve miles from Strasburg.  Not a single Confederate battalion was within five-and-twenty miles of that town, and Winder was just twice as far away.  The next morning might see the Valley turnpike blocked by 10,000 Federals under Shields.  Another 10,000, McDowell’s Second Division, under General Ord, were already near Front Royal; Fremont, with 15,000, was pressing forward from the west; and Banks and Saxton, with the same number, were moving south from the Potomac.  With resolute management it would seem that 35,000 Federals might have been assembled round Strasburg by midday of the 31st, and that this force might have been increased to 50,000 by the evening of June 1.* (* For the distribution of the different forces during this period see Note at end of chapter.) Desperate indeed appeared the Confederate chances.  The waggons which conveyed the spoils of Martinsburg and Charlestown were still at Winchester, and with them were more than 2000 prisoners.  With the utmost expedition it seemed impossible that the Valley army, even if the waggons were abandoned, could reach Strasburg before the evening of the 31st; and the Stonewall Brigade, with fifty miles to march, would be four-and-twenty hours later.  Escape, at least by the Valley turnpike, seemed absolutely impossible.  Over Pharaoh and his chariots the waters were already closing.

But there is a power in war more potent than mere numbers.  The moral difficulties of a situation may render the proudest display of physical force of no avail.  Uncertainty and apprehension engender timidity and hesitation, and if the commander is ill at ease the movements of his troops become slow and halting.  And when several armies, converging on a single point, are separated by distance or by the enemy, when communication is tedious, and each general is ignorant of his colleagues’ movements, uncertainty and apprehension are inevitable.  More than ever is this the case when the enemy has a character for swiftness and audacity, and some unfortunate detachment is still reeling under the effects of a crushing and unexpected blow.