Jackson’s success was as complete as it was sudden.  The second diversion against Washington was as effective as the first, and the victory at Winchester even more prolific of results than the defeat at Kernstown.  Within four-and-twenty hours the storm-cloud which had been gathering about Fredericksburg was dispersed.  McDowell’s army of 40,000 men and 100 guns was scattered beyond the hope of speedy concentration.  McClellan, who had pushed forward his left wing across the Chickahominy, suddenly found himself deprived of the support on which he counted to secure his right; and Johnston, who had determined to attack his opponent before that support should arrive, was able to postpone operations until the situation should become more favourable.

Immediately after his victory Jackson had sent an officer to Richmond with dispatches explaining his views, and asking for instructions.  Lee, in reply, requested him to press the enemy, to threaten an invasion of Maryland, and an assault upon the Federal capital.

May 28.

Early on the 28th, the Stonewall Brigade advanced towards Harper’s Ferry.  At that point, crowded with stores of every description, 7000 men and 18 guns, under General Saxton, had already been assembled.  At Charlestown, Winder’s advanced guard struck a reconnoitring detachment, composed of two regiments, a section of artillery, and a cavalry regiment.  Within twenty minutes the Federals, already demoralised by the defeat of Banks, were retiring in disorder, abandoning arms, blankets, and haversacks, along the road, and the pursuit was continued until their reserves were descried in strong force on the Bolivar Heights, a low ridge covering Harper’s Ferry from the south.  The same evening Ewell advanced in support of Winder; and, on the 29th, the Valley army was concentrated near Halltown, with the exception of the Louisiana brigade, posted near Berryville, the 12th Georgia, with 2 guns, in occupation of Front Royal, and Ashby, on the road to Wardensville, watching Fremont.

During the afternoon the 2nd Virginia Infantry was sent across the Shenandoah, and occupying the Loudoun Heights, threatened the enemy’s position on the ridge below.  Saxton, in consequence, withdrew a part of his troops the same night to the left bank of the Potomac; but Jackson, although Harper’s Ferry and its magazines might easily have been taken, made no attempt to follow.  His scouts, riding far to east and west, had already informed him that McDowell and Fremont were in motion to cut off his retreat.  Shields’ division, leading McDowell’s advance from Fredericksburg, was approaching Manassas Gap; while Fremont, hurrying from Franklin through the passes of the North Mountain, was ten miles east of Moorefield.  Lee’s instructions had already been carried to the extreme point consistent with safety, and Jackson determined to retreat by the Valley turnpike.  Not only was it the one road which was not yet closely threatened, but it was the one road over which the enormous train of captured stores could be rapidly withdrawn.* (* Jackson, although the harvest was in full swing, had given orders that all waggons in the valley were to be impressed and sent to Winchester and Martinsburg.)