Such blindness as Banks had shown is difficult to explain.  His latest information, previous to the attack on Kenly, told him that Jackson’s trains were arriving at Harrisonburg on the 20th, and he should certainly have inferred that Jackson was in advance of his waggons.  Now from Harrisonburg across the Massanuttons to Front Royal is fifty-five miles; so it was well within the bounds of possibility that the Confederates might reach the latter village at midday on the 23rd.  Moreover, Banks himself had recognised that Strasburg was an unfavourable position.  It is true that it was fortified, but therein lay the very reason that would induce the enemy to turn it by Front Royal.  Nor did the idea, which seems to have held possession of his mind throughout the night, that Ewell alone had been sent to destroy Kenly, and had afterwards fallen back, show much strategic insight.  Front Royal was the weak point in the Federal position.  It was of all things unlikely that a commander, energetic and skilful as Jackson was well known to be, would, when he had once advertised his presence, fail to follow up his first blow with his whole force and the utmost vigour.  It is only fair to add that the Federal authorities were no wiser than their general.  At two A.M. on the morning of the 24th, although the news of Kenly’s disaster had been fully reported, they still thought that there was time to move fresh troops to Strasburg from Baltimore and Washington.  It seemed incredible that Jackson could be at Front Royal.  “Arrangements are making,” ran Stanton’s telegram to Banks, “to send you ample reinforcements.  Do not give up the ship before succour can arrive.”

We may now turn to Jackson.

Up to the present his operations had been perfectly successful.  He had captured over 700 of the enemy, with a loss of only 40 or 50 to himself.  He had seized stores to the value of three hundred thousand dollars (60,000 pounds), and a large quantity had been burned by the enemy.  He had turned the intrenched position at Strasburg.  He threatened the Federal line of retreat.  Banks was completely at his mercy, and there seemed every prospect of inflicting on that ill-starred commander a defeat so decisive as to spread panic in the council chambers of the Northern capital.

But the problem was not so simple as it seemed.  In the first place, although the positions of the Federals had been thoroughly examined, both by staff officers and scouts, the information as to their numbers was somewhat vague.  Banks had actually about 8000 effectives at Strasburg; but so far as the Confederates knew it was quite possible that he had from 12,000 to 15,000.  There is nothing more difficult in war than to get an accurate estimate of the enemy’s numbers, especially when civilians, ignorant of military affairs, are the chief sources of information.  The agents on whom Jackson depended for intelligence from within the enemy’s lines were not always selected because of their military knowledge.