His immediate opponent, however, was a general of more resource and energy than Banks.  Milroy was at least able to supply himself with information.  On May 7 he had been advised by his scouts and spies that Jackson and Johnson had combined, and that they were advancing to attack him at M’Dowell.  At 10 A.M. the next day Schenck’s brigade arrived from Franklin, after a march of thirty-four miles in twenty-three hours, and a little later the enemy’s scouts were observed on the lofty crest of Sitlington’s Hill.  The day wore on.  The Federal battery, with muzzles elevated and the trails thrust into trenches, threw occasional shells upon the heights, and parties of skirmishers were sent across the river to develop the Confederate strength.  Johnson, to whom Jackson had confided the defence of the position, kept his troops carefully concealed, merely exposing sufficient numbers to repel the Federal patrols.  Late in the afternoon a staff officer reported to Jackson that he had discovered a rough mountain track, which, passing through the mountains to the north-west, crossed the Bull Pasture River and came out upon the road between M’Dowell and Franklin.  Orders had just been issued to move a strong detachment of artillery and infantry by this track during the night, when the Federal infantry, who had crossed the bridge under shelter of the woods, advanced in a strong line of battle up the slopes.  Their scouts had observed what they believed to be preparations for establishing a battery on the heights, and Milroy and Schenck, with a view of gaining time for retreat, had determined on attack.  Johnson had six regiments concealed behind the crest, in all about 2800 men.  Two regiments of the enemy, under 1000 strong, advanced against his front; and shortly afterwards three regiments, bringing the numbers of the attack up to 2500 rifles, assailed his left.

The Ohio and West Virginia Regiments, of which the Federal force was composed, fought with the vigour which always characterised the Western troops.* (* Jackson fully recognised the fine fighting qualities of his compatriots.  “As Shields’ brigade (division),” he wrote on April 5, “is composed principally of Western troops, who are familiar with the use of arms, we must calculate on hard fighting to oust Banks if attacked only in front, and may meet with obstinate resistance, however the attack may be made.”) The lofty heights held by the Confederates were but an illusory advantage.  So steep were the slopes in front that the men, for the most part, had to stand on the crest to deliver their fire, and their line stood out in bold relief against the evening sky.  “On the other hand,” says Dabney, “though the Federal troops had to scale the steep acclivity of the hill, they reaped the usual advantage in such cases, resulting from the high firing of the Confederates.”  The 12th Georgia, holding the centre of Johnson’s line, displayed more valour than judgment.  Having been advanced at first in front of the crest, they could not be persuaded