Jackson’s movements at this juncture are full of interest.  Friend and foe were both mystified.  Even his own officers might well ask why, in his march to Staunton, he deliberately adopted the terrible road to Port Republic.  From Elk Run Valley a metalled road passed over the Blue Ridge to Gordonsville.  Staunton by this route was twenty-four miles further than by Port Republic; but there were no obstacles to rapid marching.  And the command would have arrived no later than it actually did.  Moreover, in moving to Port Republic, eleven miles only from Harrisonburg, and within sight of the enemy’s patrols, it would seem that there was considerable risk.  Had Banks attacked the bridge whilst the Confederate artillery was dragging heavily through the mire, the consequences would probably have been unpleasant.  Even if he had not carried the bridge, the road which Jackson had chosen ran for several miles over the open plain which lies eastward of the Shenandoah, and from the commanding bluffs on the western bank his column could have been effectively shelled without the power of reply.

In moving to Staunton the Confederate commander had three objects in view:—­

1.  To strengthen his own force by combining with Edward Johnson.

2.  To prevent the Federals combining by keeping Banks stationary and defeating Milroy.

3.  To protect Staunton.

The real danger that he had to guard against was that Banks, taking advantage of his absence from the Valley, should move on Staunton.  Knowing his adversary as well as he did, he had no reason to apprehend attack during his march to Port Republic.  But it was not impossible that when he found out that Jackson had vanished from the Valley, Banks might take heart and join hands with Milroy.  It was necessary, therefore, in order to prevent Banks moving, that Jackson’s absence from the Valley should be very short; also, in order to prevent Milroy either joining Banks or taking Staunton, that Edward Johnson should be reinforced as rapidly as possible.

These objects would be attained by making use of the road to Port Republic.  In the first place, Banks would not dare to move towards Milroy so long as the flank of his line of march was threatened; and in the second place, from Port Republic to Staunton, by Mechum’s River, was little more than two days’ march.  Within forty-eight hours, therefore, using the railway, it would be possible to strengthen Johnson in time to protect Staunton, and to prevent the Federals uniting.  It was unlikely that Banks, even if he heard at once that his enemy had vanished, would immediately dash forward; and even if he did he would still have five-and-twenty miles to march before he reached Staunton.  Every precaution had been taken, too, that he should not hear of the movement across the Blue Ridge till it was too late to take advantage of it; and, as we have already seen, so late as May 5 he believed that Jackson was at Harrisonburg.  Ashby had done his work well.