The same night, “after full consultation with all leading officers,” he repeated that his troops were no longer required in the Valley, and suggested to the Secretary of War that he should be permitted to cross the Blue Ridge and clear the whole country north of Gordonsville.  “Enemy’s force there is far less than represented in newspapers—­not more than 20,000 at the outside.  Jackson’s army is reduced, demoralised, on half-rations.  They are all concentrating for Richmond...I am now satisfied that it is the most safe and effective disposition for our corps.  I pray your favourable consideration.  Such order will electrify our force.”  The force was certainly to be electrified, but the impulse was not to come from Mr. Secretary Stanton.

Banks, it may have been observed, whenever his superiors wanted him to move, had invariably the best of reasons for halting.  At one time supplies were most difficult to arrange for.  At another time the enemy was being reinforced, and his own numbers were small.  But when he was told to halt, he immediately panted to be let loose.  “The enemy was not half so strong as had been reported;” “His men were never in better condition;” “Supplies were plentiful.”  It is not impossible that Mr. Stanton had by this time discovered, as was said of a certain Confederate general, a protege of the President, that Banks had a fine career before him until Lincoln “undertook to make of him what the good Lord hadn’t, a great general.”  To the daring propositions of the late Governor and Speaker, the only reply vouchsafed was an order to fall back on Strasburg, and to transfer Shields’ division to General McDowell at Fredericksburg.

But on May 3, the day Jackson disappeared behind the Blue Ridge, Banks, to his evident discomfiture, found that his adversary had not retreated to Richmond after all.  The dashing commander, just now so anxious for one thing or the other, either to clear the Valley or to sweep the country north of Gordonsville, disappeared.  “The reduced, demoralised” enemy assumed alarming proportions.  Nothing was said about his half-rations; and as Ewell had reached Swift Run Gap with a force estimated at 12,000 men, while Jackson, according to the Federal scouts, was still near Port Republic, Banks thought it impossible to divide his force with safety.

Stanton’s reply is not on record, but it seems that he permitted Banks to retain Shields until he arrived at Strasburg; and on May 5 the Federals fell back to New Market, their commander, misled both by his cavalry and his spies, believing that Jackson had marched to Harrisonburg.

On the 7th, the day that Jackson moved west from Staunton, Banks’ fears again revived.  He was still anxious that Shields should remain with him.  “Our cavalry,” he said, “from near Harrisonburg report to-night that Jackson occupies that town, and that he has been largely reinforced.  Deserters confirm reports of Jackson’s movements in this direction.”