April 23.

Jackson, replying to Lee, stated that he was only waiting a favourable occasion to fall on Banks.  “My object,” he wrote, “has been to get in his rear at New Market or Harrisonburg, if he gives me an opportunity, and this would be the case should he advance on Staunton with his main body.  It appears to me that if I remain quiet a few days more he will probably make a move in some direction, or send a large force towards Harrisonburg, and thus enable me, with the blessing of Providence, to successfully attack his advance.  If I am unsuccessful in driving back his entire force he may be induced to move forward from New Market, and attempt to follow me through this Gap, where our forces would have greatly the advantage...

“Under all the circumstances I will direct General Ewell to move to Stanardsville.  Should Banks remain in the position of yesterday [cavalry at Harrisonburg; infantry, etc., at New Market] I will try and seek an opportunity of attacking successfully some part of his army, and if circumstances justify press forward.  My instructions from General Johnston were to unite with General Ewell near the top of the Blue Ridge, and give battle.  The course I propose would be departing from General Johnston’s instructions, but I do not believe that Banks will follow me to the Blue Ridge unless I first engage him, and I doubt whether he will then.”

But although authorised to draw Ewell to himself, and to carry out the project on which his heart was set, he still kept in view the general situation.  After he had dispatched the above letter, a report came in which led him to believe that Ewell was more needed on the Rappahannock than in the Valley.  Lee had already informed him that McDowell’s advanced guard had occupied Falmouth, on the north bank of the river, opposite Fredericksburg, on April 19, and that General Field had fallen back.

Jackson, in consequence, permitted Ewell to remain near Gordonsville, close to the railway; assuring Lee that “he would make arrangements so as not to be disappointed should Ewell be ordered to Fredericksburg."* (* O.R. volume 12 part 3 pages 863 and 864.)

Nor was this the only instance in which he demonstrated his breadth of view.  In planning co-operation with Ewell, that general had suggested that he should take a different road to that which had been recommended by General Johnston, should necessity for a combined movement arise.  Jackson protested against the route being altered.  “General Johnston,” he wrote, “does not state why he desires you to go (by this road), but it may be for the purpose of deceiving the enemy with regard to your ultimate destination, to be more distant from the enemy during the movement, and also to be in a more favourable position for reinforcing some other points should it be necessary.”  The interests of his own force, here as always, were subordinated to those of the army which was defending Richmond.