Lincoln had been induced to relax his hold on the army corps which he had held back at Manassas to protect the capital, and McDowell was already moving on Fredericksburg, sixty miles north of Richmond.  Here he was to be joined by Shields, bringing his force for the field up to 40,000 men; and the fall of Yorktown was to be the signal for his advance on the Confederate capital.  Johnston still held the lines, but he was outnumbered by more than two to one, and the enemy was disembarking heavy ordnance.  It was evident that the end could not be long delayed, and that in case of retreat every single Confederate soldier, from the Valley and elsewhere, would have to be brought to Richmond for the decisive battle.  Jackson was thus bound to his present position, close to the railway, and his orders from Johnston confined him to a strictly defensive attitude.  In case Banks advanced eastward he was to combine with Ewell, and receive attack in the passes of the Blue Ridge.

Such cautious strategy, to one so fully alive to the opportunity offered by McClellan’s retention before Yorktown, was by no means acceptable.  When his orders reached him, Jackson was already weaving plans for the discomfiture of his immediate adversary, and it may be imagined with what reluctance, although he gave no vent to his chagrin, he accepted the passive role which had been assigned to him.

No sooner, however, had he reached Elk Run Valley than the telegraph brought most welcome news.  In a moment of unwonted wisdom the Confederate President had charged General Lee with the control of all military operations in Virginia, and on April 21 came a letter to Jackson which foreshadowed the downfall of McClellan and the rout of the invaders.

April 21.

McDowell’s advance from Manassas had already become known to the Confederates, and Lee had divined what this movement portended.  “I have no doubt,” he wrote to Jackson, “that an attempt will be made to occupy Fredericksburg and use it as a base of operations against Richmond.  Our present force there is very small, (2,500 men under General Field), and cannot be reinforced except by weakening other corps.  If you can use General Ewell’s division in an attack on Banks, it will prove a great relief to the pressure on Fredericksburg."* (* O.R. volume 12 part 3 page 859.)

This view of the situation was in exact agreement with Jackson’s own views.  He had already made preparation for combined action with Ewell.  For some days they had been in active correspondence.  The exact route which Ewell should take to the Blue Ridge had been decided on.  The roads had been reconnoitred.  Jackson had supplied a map identical with his own, and had furnished an officer to act as guide.  A service of couriers had been established across the mountains, and no precaution had been neglected.  Ewell was instructed to bring five days’ rations.  He was warned that there would be no necessity for a forced march; he was to encamp at cross-roads, and he was to rest on Sunday.* (* O.R. volume 12 part 3 pages 849, 854 and 857.)