The tardy progress of the Federals from Woodstock to Harrisonburg had been due rather to the perplexities of their commander than to the difficulties of supply; and Banks had got clear of the Massanuttons only to meet with fresh embarrassments.  Jackson’s move to Elk Run Valley was a complete checkmate.  His opponent felt that he was dangerously exposed.  McClellan had not yet begun his advance on Richmond; and, so long as that city was secure from immediate attack, the Confederates could spare men to reinforce Jackson.  The railway ran within easy reach of Swift Run Gap, and the troops need not be long absent from the capital.  Ewell, too, with a force of unknown strength, was not far distant.  Banks could expect no help from Fremont.  Both generals were anxious to work together, and plans had been submitted to Washington which would probably have secured the capture of Staunton and the control of the railway.  But the Secretary of War rejected all advice.  Fremont was given to understand that under no circumstances was he to count on Banks,* (* O.R. volume 12 page 104.) and the latter was told to halt at Harrisonburg.  “It is not the desire of the President,” wrote Mr. Stanton on April 26, “that you should prosecute a further advance towards the south.  It is possible that events may make it necessary to transfer the command of General Shields to the department of the Rappahannock [i.e. to the First Army Corps], and you are desired to act accordingly.”  To crown all, Blenker’s division, which had reached Winchester, instead of being sent to support Banks, forty-five miles distant by the Valley turnpike, was ordered to join Fremont in the Alleghanies by way of Romney, involving a march of one hundred and twenty miles, over bad roads, before it could reinforce his advanced brigade.

Stanton, in writing to Banks, suggested that he should not let his advanced guard get too far ahead of the main body; but be does not appear to have seen that the separation of Banks, Fremont, and Blenker, and the forward position of the two former, which he had determined to maintain, was even more dangerous.* (* Jackson had recognised all along the mistake the Federals had made in pushing comparatively small forces up the Valley before McClellan closed in on Richmond.  On April 5, when Banks was at Woodstock, he wrote:  “Banks is very cautious.  As he belongs to McClellan’s army, I suppose that McClellan is at the helm, and that he would not, even if Banks so desired, permit him to advance much farther until other parts of his army are farther advanced.” (O.R. volume 12 part 3 page 843).  He did not know that at the date he wrote the President and Mr. Stanton had relieved McClellan at the helm.) His lesson was to come, for Jackson, by no means content with arresting Banks’ march, was already contemplating that general’s destruction.