objective, because, by seizing that town, he would threaten Edward Johnson’s rear, open the way for Fremont, and then, crossing the Blue Ridge, place himself so near the communications of the main army with Richmond that it would be compelled to fall back to defend them.  Nor, in any case, did he agree with Johnston that the occupation of Front Royal would prevent Banks leaving the Valley and marching to Manassas.  Twenty miles due east of Winchester is Snicker’s Gap, where a good road crosses the Blue Ridge, and eight miles south another turnpike leads over Ashby’s Gap.  By either of these Banks could reach Manassas just as rapidly as Jackson could join Johnston; and, while 4500 men could scarcely be expected to detain 20,000, they might very easily be cut off by a portion of the superior force.

If a junction with the main army were absolutely necessary, Jackson was of opinion that the move ought to be made at once, and the Valley abandoned.  If, on the other hand, it was desirable to keep Banks and McClellan separated, the best means of doing so was to draw the former up the North Fork; and at Mount Jackson, covering the New Market to Luray road, the Valley troops would be as near the Rapidan as if they were at Front Royal.* (* Dabney volume 2 pages 22 and 23.  O.R. volume 5 page 1087.) The strategical advantages which such a position would offer—­the isolation of the troops pursuing him, the chance of striking their communications from the South Fork Valley, and, if reinforcements were granted, of cutting off their retreat by a rapid movement from Luray to Winchester—­were always present to Jackson’s mind.* (* Cf letters of April 5.  O.R. volume 12 part 3 pages 843 and 844.)

An additional argument was that at the time when these alternatives were discussed the road along South Fork was so bad as to make marching difficult; and it was to this rather than to Jackson’s strategical conceptions that Johnston appears to have ultimately yielded.

Be this as it may, the sum of Jackson’s operations was satisfactory in the extreme.  On March 27 he had written to Johnston, “I will try and draw the enemy on.”  On April 16 Banks was exactly where he wished him, well up the North Fork of the Shenandoah, cut off by the Massanuttons from Manassas, and by the Alleghanies from Fremont.  The two detachments which held the Valley, his own force at Mount Jackson, and Edward Johnson’s 2800 on the Shenandoah Mountain, were in close communication, and could at any time, if permitted by the higher authorities, combine against either of the columns which threatened Staunton.  “What I desire,” he said to Mr. Boteler, a friend in the Confederate Congress, “is to hold the country, as far as practicable, until we are in a condition to advance; and then, with God’s blessing, let us make thorough work of it.  But let us start right.”

On April 7 he wrote to his wife as follows:—­