separated the outposts was not more than ten yards wide.  About one-fourth of a mile away there was a thick wood, in which the enemy concealed his batteries until he chose to stir us up, when he would sneak up behind the cover, open upon us at an unexpected moment, and retreat rapidly when we replied.”  It was doubtless by such constant evidence of his vigilance that Ashby imposed caution on the enemy’s reconnoitring parties.  The fact remains that Jackson’s camps, six miles to the rear, were never once alarmed, nor could Banks obtain any reliable information.

This period of repose was spent by Jackson in reorganising his regiments, in writing letters to his wife, and, like his old class-mate, Gordon, in admiring the scenery.  It is not to be supposed that his enforced inaction was altogether to his taste.  With an enemy within sight of his outposts his bold and aggressive spirit must have been sorely tried.  But with his inferior numbers prudence cried patience, and he had reason to be well content with the situation.  He had been instructed to prevent Banks from detaching troops to reinforce McClellan.  To attain an object in war the first consideration is to make no mistakes yourself; the next, to take instant advantage of those made by your opponent.  But compliance with this rule does not embrace the whole art of generalship.  The enemy may be too discreet to commit himself to risky manoeuvres.  If the campaigns of the great masters of war are examined, it will be found that they but seldom adopted a quiescent attitude, but by one means or another, by acting on their adversary’s morale, or by creating false impressions, they induced him to make a false step, and to place himself in a position which made it easy for them to attain their object.  The greatest general has been defined as “he who makes the fewest mistakes;” but “he who compels his adversary to make the most mistakes” is a definition of equal force; and it may even be questioned whether the general whose imagination is unequal to the stratagems which bring mistakes about is worthy of the name.  He may be a trustworthy subordinate, but he can scarcely become a great leader.

Johnston had advised, when, at the beginning of March, the retreat of the Confederates from Winchester was determined on, that Jackson should fall back on Front Royal, and thence, if necessary, up the South Fork of the Shenandoah.  His force would thus be in close communication with the main army behind the Rapidan; and it was contrary, in the General-in-Chief’s opinion, to all sound discretion to permit the enemy to attain a point, such as Front Royal, which would render it possible for him to place himself between them.  Jackson, however, declared his preference for a retreat up the North Fork, in the direction of Staunton.  Why should Banks join McClellan at all?  McClellan, so Jackson calculated, had already more men with him than he could feed; and he believed, therefore, that Staunton would be Banks’