According to the reports of his regimental commanders, Jackson took into battle (including 48th Virginia) 3087 N.C.O. and men of infantry, 290 cavalry, and 27 guns. 2742 infantry, 290 cavalry, and 18 guns were engaged, and his total strength, including officers, was probably about 3500. Shields, in his first report of the battle, put down the strength of his own division as between 7000 and 8000 men. Four days later he declared that it did not exceed 7000, namely 6000 infantry, 750 cavalry, and 24 guns. It is probable that only those actually engaged are included in this estimate, for on March 17 he reported the strength of the troops which were present at Kernstown six days later as 8374 infantry, 608 artillerymen, and 780 cavalry; total, 9752.* (* O.R. volume 12 part 3 page 4.)
CHAPTER 1.9. M’DOWELL.
1862. March 23.
The stars were still shining when the Confederates began their retreat from Kernstown. With the exception of seventy, all the wounded had been brought in, and the army followed the ambulances as far as Woodstock.
March 25.
There was little attempt on the part of the Federals to improve their victory. The hard fighting of the Virginians had left its impress on the generals. Jackson’s numbers were estimated at 15,000, and Banks, who arrived in time to take direction of the pursuit, preferred to wait till Williams’ two brigades came up before he moved. He encamped that night at Cedar Creek, eight miles from Kernstown. The next day he reached Strasburg. The cavalry pushed on to near Woodstock, and there, for the time being, the pursuit terminated. Shields, who remained at Winchester to nurse his wound, sent enthusiastic telegrams announcing that the retreat was a flight, and that the houses along the road were filled with Jackson’s dead and dying; yet the truth was that the Confederates were in nowise pressed, and only the hopeless cases had been left behind.* (* Major Harman wrote on March 26 that 150 wounded had been brought to Woodstock. Manuscript.) Had the 2000 troopers at Banks’ disposal been sent forward at daybreak on the 24th, something might have been done. The squadrons, however, incapable of moving across country, were practically useless in pursuit; and to start even at daybreak was to start too late. If the fruits of victory are to be secured, the work must be put in hand whilst the enemy is still reeling under the shock. A few hours’ delay gives him time to recover his equilibrium, to organise a rear-guard, and to gain many miles on his rearward march.
March 26.
On the night of the 26th, sixty hours after the battle ceased, the Federal outposts were established along Tom’s Brook, seventeen miles from Kernstown. On the opposite bank were Ashby’s cavalry, while Burks’ brigade lay at Woodstock, six miles further south. The remainder of the Valley army had reached Mount Jackson.