his troops eastward of the pike.  A strong force of infantry, with waving colours, was plainly visible to the Confederates, and it was seen that the extreme left was protected by several guns.  On the right of the road was a line of skirmishers, deployed along the base of Pritchard’s Hill, and on the knoll itself stood two batteries.  The wooded ridge to westward was as yet unoccupied, except by scouting parties.

Jackson at once determined to turn the enemy’s right.  An attack upon the Federal left would have to be pushed across the open fields and decided by fair fighting, gun and rifle against gun and rifle, and on that flank the enemy was prepared for battle.  Could he seize the wooded ridge on his left, the initiative would be his.  His opponent would be compelled to conform to his movements.  The advantages of a carefully selected position would be lost.  Instead of receiving attack where he stood, the Federal general would have to change front to meet it, to execute movements which he had possibly not foreseen, to fight on ground with which he was unfamiliar; and, instead of carrying out a plan which had been previously thought out, to conceive a new one on the spur of the moment, and to issue immediate orders for a difficult operation.  Hesitation and confusion might ensue; and in place of a strongly established line, confidently awaiting the advance, isolated regiments, in all the haste and excitement of rapid movement, or hurriedly posted in unfavourable positions, would probably oppose the Confederate onset.  Such are the advantages which accrue to the force which delivers an attack where it is not expected; and, to all appearance, Jackson’s plan of battle promised to bring them into play to the very fullest extent.  The whole force of the enemy, as reported by Ashby, was before him, plainly visible.  To seize the wooded ridge, while the cavalry held the Federals fast in front; to pass beyond Pritchard’s Hill, and to cut the line of retreat on Winchester, seemed no difficult task.  The only danger was the possibility of a counterstroke while the Confederates were executing their turning movement.  But the enemy, so far as Jackson’s information went, was rapidly withdrawing from the Valley.  The force confronting him was no more than a rear-guard; and it was improbable in the extreme that a mere rear-guard would involve itself in a desperate engagement.  The moment its line of retreat was threatened it would probably fall back.  To provide, however, against all emergencies, Colonel Burks’ brigade of three battalions was left for the present in rear of Kernstown, and here, too, remained four of the field batteries.  With the remainder of his force, two brigades of infantry and a battery, Jackson moved off to his left.  Two companies of the 5th Virginia were recruited from Winchester.  Early in the day the general had asked the regiment for a guide familiar with the locality; and, with the soldier showing the way, the 27th Virginia, with two of Carpenter’s guns as advanced guard, struck westward by a waggon track across the meadows, while Ashby pressed the Federals in front of Kernstown.