Banks, in accordance with his instructions, occupied the town, and awaited further orders.  These came on the 18th,* (* O.R. volume 12 part 1 page 164.) and Shields’ division of 11,000 men with 27 guns was at once pushed on to Strasburg.  Jackson had already withdrawn, hoping to draw Banks up the Valley, and was now encamped near Mount Jackson, a strong position twenty-five miles further south, the indefatigable Ashby still skirmishing with the enemy.  The unusual audacity which prompted the Federal advance was probably due to the fact that the exact strength of the Confederate force had been ascertained in Winchester.  At all events, all apprehension of attack had vanished.  Jackson’s 4500 men were considered a quantite negligeable, a mere corps of observation; and not only was Shields sent forward without support, but a large portion of Banks’ corps was ordered to another field.  Its role as an independent force had ceased.  Its movements were henceforward to be subordinate to those of the main army, and McClellan designed to bring it into closer connection with his advance on Richmond.  How his design was frustrated, how he struggled in vain to correct the original dissemination of his forces, how his right wing was held in a vice by Jackson, and how his initial errors eventually ruined his campaign, is a strategical lesson of the highest import.

From the day McClellan took command the Army of the Potomac had done practically nothing.  Throughout the winter troops had poured into Washington at the rate of 40,000 a month.  At the end of December there were 148,000 men fit for duty.  On March 20 the grand aggregate was 240,000.* (* O.R. volume 11 part 3 page 26.) But during the winter no important enterprise had been undertaken.  The colours of the rebels were still flaunting within sight of the forts of Washington, and the mouth of the Potomac was securely closed by Confederate batteries.  With a mighty army at their service it is little wonder that the North became restive and reproached their general.  It is doubtless true that the first thing needful was organisation.  To discipline and consolidate the army so as to make success assured was unquestionably the wiser policy.  The impatience of a sovereign people, ignorant of war, is not to be lightly yielded to.  At the same time, the desire of a nation cannot be altogether disregarded.  A general who obstinately refuses to place himself in accord with the political situation forfeits the confidence of his employers and the cordial support of the Administration.  The cry throughout the North was for action.  The President took it upon himself to issue a series of orders.  The army was ordered to advance on February 22, a date chosen because it was Washington’s birthday, just as the third and most disastrous assault on Plevna was delivered on the “name-day” of the Czar.  McClellan secured delay.  His plans were not yet ripe.  The Virginia roads were still impassable.  The season was not yet sufficiently