Jackson had withdrawn the previous evening.  Twice, on March 7 and again on the 11th, he had offered battle.* (* Major Harman, of Jackson’s staff, writing to his brother on March 6, says:  “The general told me last night that the Yankees had 17,000 men at the two points, Charlestown and Bunker Hill.”  On March 8 he writes:  “3000 effective men is about the number of General Jackson’s force.  The sick, those on furlough, and the deserters from the militia, reduce him to about that number.”  Manuscript.) His men had remained under arms all day in the hope that the enemy’s advanced guard might be tempted to attack.  But the activity of Ashby’s cavalry, and the boldness with which Jackson maintained his position, impressed his adversary with the conviction that the Confederate force was much greater than it really was.  It was reported in the Federal camps that the enemy’s strength was from 7000 to 11,000 men, and that the town was fortified.  Jackson’s force did not amount to half that number, and, according to a Northern officer, “one could have jumped over his intrenchments as easily as Remus over the walls of Rome.”

Jackson abandoned Winchester with extreme reluctance.  Besides being the principal town in that section of the Valley, it was strategically important to the enemy.  Good roads led in every direction, and communication was easy with Romney and Cumberland to the north-west, and with Washington and Manassas to the south-east.  Placed at Winchester, Banks could support, or be supported by, the troops in West Virginia or the army south of Washington.  A large and fertile district would thus be severed from the Confederacy, and the line of invasion across the Upper Potomac completely blocked.  Overwhelming as was the strength of the Union force, exceeding his own by more than eight to one, great as was the caution of the Federal leader, it was only an unlucky accident that restrained Jackson from a resolute endeavour to at least postpone the capture of the town.  He had failed to induce the enemy’s advanced guard to attack him in position.  To attack himself, in broad daylight, with such vast disproportion of numbers, was out of the question.  His resources, however, were not exhausted.  After dark on the 12th, when his troops had left the town, he called a council, consisting of General Garnett and the regimental commanders of the Stonewall Brigade, and proposed a night attack on the Federal advance.  When the troops had eaten their supper and rested for some hours, they were to march to the neighbourhood of the enemy, some four miles north of Winchester, and make the attack before daylight.  The Federal troops were raw and inexperienced.  Prestige was on the side of the Confederates, and their morale was high.  The darkness, the suddenness and energy of the attack, the lack of drill and discipline, would all tend to throw the enemy into confusion; and “by the vigorous use of the bayonet, and the blessing of divine Providence,” Jackson believed