is already a good soldier, and that the same qualities which serve in a street-brawl are all that is necessary to make a general.  Nor were historical precedents wanting for the mistakes of the American statesmen.  In both the Peninsula and the Crimea, lives, treasure, and prestige were as recklessly wasted as in Virginia; and staff officers who owed their positions to social influence alone, generals, useless and ignorant, who succeeded to responsible command by virtue of seniority and a long purse, were the standing curse of the English army.  At the same time, it may well be questioned whether some of the regular officers would have done better than Banks.  He was no fool, and if he had not studied the art of war, there have been barrack-square generals who have showed as much ignorance without one-quarter his ability.  Natural commonsense has often a better chance of success than a rusty brain, and a mind narrowed by routine.  After serving in twenty campaigns Frederick the Great’s mules were still mules.  On this very theatre of war, in the forests beyond Romney, an English general had led a detachment of English soldiers to a defeat as crushing as it was disgraceful, and Braddock was a veteran of many wars.  Here, too, Patterson, an officer of Volunteers who had seen much service, had allowed Johnston to slip away and join Beauregard on Bull Run.  The Northern people, in good truth, had as yet no reason to place implicit confidence in the leading of trained soldiers.  They had yet to learn that mere length of service is no test whatever of capacity for command, and that character fortified by knowledge is the only charm which attracts success.

Jackson had already some acquaintance with Banks.  During the Romney expedition the latter had been posted at Frederick with 16,000 men, and a more enterprising commander would at least have endeavoured to thwart the Confederate movements.  Banks, supine in his camps, made neither threat nor demonstration.  Throughout the winter, Ashby’s troopers had ridden unmolested along the bank of the Potomac.  Lander alone had worried the Confederate outposts, driven in their advanced detachments, and drawn supplies from the Virginian farms.  Banks had been over-cautious and inactive, and Jackson had not failed to note his characteristics.

March 9.

Up to March 9 the Federal general, keeping his cavalry in rear, had pushed forward no farther than Charlestown and Bunker Hill.  On that day the news reached McClellan that the Confederates were preparing to abandon Centreville.  He at once determined to push forward his whole army.

March 12.

Banks was instructed to move on Winchester, and on the morning of the 12th his leading division occupied the town.