a veteran of the Mexican campaign, had succeeded him, and the force at both Romney and Frederick had been increased.  In the West things were going badly for the new Republic.  The Union troops had overrun Kentucky, Missouri, and the greater part of Tennessee.  A Confederate army had been defeated; Confederate forts captured; and “the amphibious power” of the North had already been effectively exerted.  Various towns on the Atlantic seaboard had been occupied.  Not one of the European Powers had evinced a decided intention of espousing the Confederate cause, and the blockade still exercised its relentless pressure.

It was not, however, until the end of February that the great host beyond the Potomac showed symptoms of approaching movement.  But it had long been evident that both Winchester and Centreville must soon be abandoned.  Johnston was as powerless before McClellan as Jackson before Banks.  Even if by bringing fortification to their aid they could hold their ground against the direct attack of far superior numbers, they could not prevent their intrenchments being turned.  McClellan had at his disposal the naval resources of the North.  It would be no difficult task to transfer his army by the broad reaches of the Potomac and the Chesapeake to some point on the Virginia coast, and to intervene between Centreville and Richmond.  At the same time the army of Western Virginia, which was now under command of General Fremont, might threaten Jackson in rear by moving on Staunton from Beverley and the Great Kanawha, while Banks assailed him in front.* (* Fortunately for the Confederates this army had been reduced to 18,000 men, and the want of transport, together with the condition of the mountain roads, kept it stationary until the weather improved.)

Johnston was already preparing to retreat.  Jackson, reluctant to abandon a single acre of his beloved Valley to the enemy, was nevertheless constrained to face the possibilities of such a course.  His wife was sent back to her father’s home in the same train that conveyed his sick to Staunton; baggage and stores were removed to Mount Jackson, half-way up the Shenandoah Valley, and his little army, which had now been increased to three brigades, or 4600 men all told, was ordered to break up its camps. 38,000 Federals had gradually assembled between Frederick and Romney.  Banks, who commanded the whole force, was preparing to advance, and his outposts were already established on the south bank of the Potomac.

But when the Confederate column filed through the streets of Winchester, it moved not south but north.

Such was Jackson’s idea of a retreat.  To march towards the enemy, not away from him; to watch his every movement; to impose upon him with a bold front; to delay him to the utmost; and to take advantage of every opportunity that might offer for offensive action.