January 24.

On January 24 Jackson returned to Winchester.  His strategy had been successful.  He had driven the enemy across the Potomac.  He had destroyed for a time an important line of supply.  He had captured a few prisoners and many stores; and this with a loss of 4 men killed and 28 wounded.  The Federal forces along the border were far superior to his own.  The dispersion of these forces from Cumberland to Frederick, a distance of eighty miles, had doubtless been much in his favour.  But when he marched from Winchester he had reason to believe that 8000 men were posted at Frederick, 2000 at Hagerstown, 2000 at Williamsport, 2000 at Hancock, and 12,000 at Cumberland and Romney.  The actual effective strength of these garrisons may possibly have been smaller than had been reported, but such were the numbers which he had to take into consideration when planning his operations.  It would appear from the map that while he was at Romney, 12,000 Federals might have moved out from Williamsport and Harper’s Ferry and have cut him off from Winchester.  This danger had to be kept in view.  But the enemy had made no preparations for crossing the Potomac; the river was a difficult obstacle; and Banks was not the man to run risks.* (* “Any attempt,” Banks reported to McClellan, “to intercept the enemy would have been unsuccessful...It would have resulted in almost certain failure to cut him off, and have brought an exhausted force into his presence to fight him in his stronghold at Winchester.  In any case, it promised no positive prospect of success, nor did it exclude large chances of disaster.”  (O.R. volume 5 page 694.)

At the same time, while Jackson was in all probability perfectly aware of the difficulties which Banks refused to face, and counted on that commander’s hesitation, it must be admitted that his manoeuvres had been daring, and that the mere thought of the enemy’s superior numbers would have tied down a general of inferior ability to the passive defence of Winchester.  Moreover, the results attained were out of all proportion to the trifling loss which had been incurred.  An important recruiting-ground had been secured.  The development of Union sentiment, which, since the occupation of Romney by the Federals, had been gradually increasing along the Upper Potomac, would be checked by the presence of Southern troops.  A base for further operations against the Federal detachments in West Virginia had been established, and a fertile region opened to the operations of the Confederate commissaries.  These strategic advantages, however, were by no means appreciated by the people of Virginia.  The sufferings of the troops appealed more forcibly to their imagination than the prospective benefit to be derived by the Confederacy.  Jackson’s secrecy, as absolute as that of the grave, had an ill effect.  Unable to comprehend his combinations, even his own officers ascribed his manoeuvres to a restless craving for personal distinction; while civilian