“Admitting that the season is too far advanced, or that from other causes all cannot be accomplished that has been named, yet through the blessing of God, who has thus far wonderfully prospered our cause, much more may be expected from General Loring’s troops, according to this programme, than can be expected from them where they are."* (* O.R. volume 5 page 965.)

This scheme was endorsed by Johnston.  “I submit,” he wrote, “that the troops under General Loring might render valuable services by taking the field with General Jackson, instead of going into winter quarters as now proposed.”

In accordance with Jackson’s suggestion, Loring was ordered to join him.  Edward Johnson, however, was withheld.  The Confederate authorities seem to have considered it injudicious to leave unguarded the mountain roads which lead into the Valley from the west.  Jackson, with a wider grasp of war, held that concentration at Winchester was a sounder measure of security.  “Should the Federals” (at Beverley), he said, “take advantage of the withdrawal of Johnson’s troops, and cross the mountains, so much the worse for them.  While they were marching eastwards, involving themselves amongst interminable obstacles, he [Jackson] would place himself on their communications and close in behind them, making their destruction the more certain the further they advanced towards their imaginary prize."* (* Dabney volume 1 page 298.)

While waiting for Loring, Jackson resolved to complete the education of his new battalions in the field.  The raw troops who garrisoned the Northern border were not formidable enemies, and a sudden rush upon some ill-defended post would give to the staff and soldiery that first taste of success which gives heart and backbone to inexperienced troops.

December 6 to 9.

The first enterprise, however, was only partially successful.  The destruction of a dam on the Chesapeake and Ohio Canal, one of the main arteries of communication between Washington and the West, by which coal, hay, and forage reached the Union capital, was the result of a few days’ hard marching and hard work.  Two companies of the Stonewall Brigade volunteered to go down by night and cut the cribs.  Standing waist deep in the cold water, and under the constant fire of the enemy, they effected a partial breach; but it was repaired by the Federals within two days.  Jackson’s loss was one man killed.  While engaged in this expedition news reached him of the decisive repulse by Colonel Edward Johnson of an attack on his position on Alleghany Mountain.  Jackson again asked that this brigade might be sent to his support, but it was again refused, notwithstanding Johnston’s endorsement of his request.

Loring reached Winchester on Christmas Day.  Once more the enemy threatened to advance, and information had been received that he had been largely strengthened.  Jackson was of opinion that the true policy of the Federals would be to concentrate at Martinsburg, midway between Romney and Frederick, and “to march on Winchester over a road that presented no very strong positions.”  To counteract such a combination, he determined to anticipate their movements, and to attack them before they received additional reinforcements.