“’Crossing the Upper Potomac, occupying Baltimore, and taking possession of Maryland, we could cut off the communications of Washington, force the Federal Government to abandon the capital, beat McClellan’s army if it came out against us in the open country, destroy industrial establishments wherever we found them, break up the lines of interior commercial intercourse, close the coal-mines, seize and, if necessary, destroy the manufactories and commerce of Philadelphia, and of other large cities in our reach; take and hold the narrow neck of country between Pittsburg and Lake Erie; subsist mainly the country we traverse, and making unrelenting war amidst their homes, force the people of the North to understand what it will cost them to hold the South in the Union at the bayonet’s point.’

“He then requested me to use my influence with Generals Johnston and Beauregard in favour of immediate aggressive operations.  I told him that I was sure that an attempt on my part to exert any influence in favour of his proposition would do no good.  Not content with my answer he repeated his arguments, dwelling more at length on the advantages of such strategy to ourselves and its disadvantages to the enemy, and again urged me to use my influence to secure its adoption.  I gave him the same reply I had already made.

“After a few minutes’ thought he abruptly said:  ’General, you have not expressed any opinion in regard to the views I have laid before you.  But I feel assured that you favour them, and I think you ought to do all in your power to have them carried into effect.’

“I then said, ‘I will tell you a secret.’

“He replied, ’Please do not tell me any secret.  I would prefer not to hear it.’  I answered, ’I must tell it to you, and I have no hesitation in doing so, because I am certain that it will not be divulged.’  I then explained to him that these views had already been laid before the Government, in a conference which had taken place at Fairfax Court House, in the first days of October, between President Davis, Generals Johnston, Beauregard, and myself, and told him the result.

“When I had finished, he rose from the ground, on which he had been seated, shook my hand warmly, and said, ‘I am sorry, very sorry.’

“Without another word he went slowly out to his horse, a few feet in front of my tent, mounted very deliberately, and rode sadly away.  A few days afterwards he was ordered to the Valley.* (* Letter of General G.W.  Smith to the author.)

November 5.

It was under such depressing circumstances that Jackson quitted the army which, boldly used, might have ensured the existence of the Confederacy.  His headquarters were established at Winchester; and, in communication with Centreville by road, rail, and telegraph, although sixty miles distant, he was still subordinate to Johnston.  The Confederate front extended from Fredericksburg on the Rappahannock to Winchester on the Opequon.  Jackson’s force, holding the Valley of the Shenandoah and the line of the Potomac westward of Point of Rocks, was the extreme outpost on the left, and was connected with the main body by a detachment at Leesburg, on the other side of the Blue Ridge, under his brother-in-law, General D.H.  Hill.