than attack.  There was nothing to interfere with a forward movement.  There were supplies along the railway, and if the mechanism for their distribution and the means for their carriage were wanting, the counties adjoining the Potomac were rich and fertile.  Herds of bullocks were grazing in the pastures, and the barns of the farmers were loaded with grain.  It was not a long supply train that was lacking, nor an experienced staff, nor even well-disciplined battalions; but a general who grasped the full meaning of victory, who understood how a defeated army, more especially of new troops, yields at a touch, and who, above all, saw the necessity of giving the North no leisure to develop her immense resources.  For three days Jackson impatiently awaited the order to advance, and his men were held ready with three days’ cooked rations in their haversacks.  But his superiors gave no sign, and he was reluctantly compelled to abandon all hope of reaping the fruits of victory.

It is true that the Confederates were no more fit for offensive operations than McDowell’s troops.  “Our army,” says General Johnston, “was more disorganised by victory than that of the United States by defeat.”  But it is to be remembered that if the Southerners had moved into Maryland, crossing the Potomac by some of the numerous fords near Harper’s Ferry, they would have found no organised opposition, save the debris of McDowell’s army, between them and the Northern capital.  On July 26, five days after the battle, the general who was to succeed McDowell arrived in Washington and rode round the city.  “I found,” he wrote, “no preparations whatever for defence, not even to the extent of putting the troops in military position.  Not a regiment was properly encamped, not a single avenue of approach guarded.  All was chaos, and the streets, hotels, and bar-rooms were filled with drunken officers and men, absent from their regiments without leave, a perfect pandemonium.  Many had even gone to their homes, their flight from Bull Run terminating in New York, or even in New Hampshire and Maine.  There was really nothing to prevent a small cavalry force from riding into the city.  A determined attack would doubtless have carried Arlington Heights and placed the city at the mercy of a battery of rifled guns.  If the Secessionists attached any value to the possession of Washington, they committed their greatest error in not following up the victory of Bull Run.”  On the same date, the Secretary of War, Mr. Stanton, wrote as follows:  “The capture of Washington seems now to be inevitable; during the whole of Monday and Tuesday [July 22 and 23] it might have been taken without resistance.  The rout, overthrow, and demoralisation of the whole army were complete."* (* McClellan’s Own Story pages 66 and 67.)

Of his own share in the battle, either at the time or afterwards, Jackson said but little.  A day or two after the battle an anxious crowd was gathered round the post-office at Lexington, awaiting intelligence from the front.  A letter was handed to the Reverend Dr. White, who, recognising the handwriting, exclaimed to the eager groups about him, “Now we shall know all the facts.”  On opening it he found the following, and no more:—­