The analogy of a person who has been sentenced to imprisonment for a certain period, and who, on the expiration of that period, is at once released, has been referred to, as apposite to the case of a definite suspension.  Still more appropriately may we refer to the case of a person transported for a term of years, and who cannot return until that term expires, but who is at liberty at once to do so when it has expired.  “Another capital offense against public justice,” says Blackstone, “is the returning from transportation, or being seen at large in Great Britain before the expiration of the term for which the offender was sentenced to be transported.” Mark these qualifying words:  “before the expiration of the term:”  they include, from the very force of language, the proposition that it is no offense to return after the expiration of the term.  And so changing certain words to meet the change of circumstances, but leaving the principle unchanged, we may lay down the law in relation to restorations from definite suspensions, as follows: 

It is an offense against the masonic code to claim the privileges of Masonry, or to attempt to visit a lodge after having been suspended, before the expiration of the term for which the offender was suspended.

Of course, it is no crime to resume these privileges after the term has expired; for surely he must have strange notions of the powers of language, who supposes that suspension for three months, and no more, does not mean, that when the three months are over the suspension ceases.  And, if the suspension ceases, the person is no longer suspended; and, if no longer suspended he is in good standing, and requires no further action to restore him to good moral and masonic health.

But it is said that, although originally only suspended for three months, at the expiration of that period, his conduct might continue to be such as to render his restoration a cause of public reproach.  What is to be done in such a case?  It seems strange that the question should be asked.  The remedy is only too apparent.  Let new charges be preferred, and let a new trial take place for his derelictions of duty during the term of his suspension.  Then, the lodge may again suspend him for a still longer period, or altogether expel him, if it finds him deserving such punishment.  But in the name of justice, law, and common sense, do not insiduously and unmanfully continue a sentence for one and a former offense, as a punishment for another and a later one, and that, too, without the due forms of trial.

Let us, in this case, go again for an analogy to the laws of the land.  Suppose an offender had been sentenced to an imprisonment of six months for a larceny, and that while in prison he had committed some new crime.  When the six months of his sentence had expired, would the Sheriff feel justified, or even the Judge who had sentenced him, in saying:  “I will not release you; you have guilty of another offense