But the doctrine, that after the expiration of the term of a definite suspension, an action by the lodge is still necessary to a complete restoration, is capable of producing much mischief and oppression.  For, if the lodge not only has a right, but is under the necessity of taking up the case anew, and deciding whether the person who had been suspended for three months, and whose period of suspension has expired, shall now be restored, it follows, that the members of the lodge, in the course of their inquiry, are permitted to come to such conclusion as they may think just and fit; for to say that they, after all their deliberations, are, to vote only in one way, would be too absurd to require any consideration.  They may, therefore, decide that A.B., having undergone the sentence of the lodge, shall be restored, and then of course all would be well, and no more is to be said.  But suppose that they decide otherwise, and say that A.B., having undergone the sentence of suspension of three months, shall not be restored, but must remain suspended until further orders.  Here, then, a party would have been punished a second time for the same offense, and that, too, after having suffered what, at the time of his conviction, was supposed to be a competent punishment—­and without a trial, and without the necessary opportunities of defense, again found guilty, and his comparatively light punishment of suspension for three months changed into a severer one, and of an indefinite period.  The annals of the most arbitrary government in the world—­the history of the most despotic tyrant that ever lived—­could not show an instance of more unprincipled violation of law and justice than this.  And yet it may naturally be the result of the doctrine, that in a sentence of definite suspension, the party can be restored only by a vote of the lodge at the expiration of his term of suspension.  If the lodge can restore him, it can as well refuse to restore him, and to refuse to restore him would be to inflict a new punishment upon him for an old and atoned-for offense.

On the 1st of January, for instance, A.B., having been put upon his trial, witnesses having been examined, his defense having been heard, was found guilty by his lodge of some offense, the enormity of which, whatever it might be, seemed to require a suspension from Masonry for just three months, neither more nor less.  If the lodge had thought the crime still greater, it would, of course, we presume, have decreed a suspension of six, nine, or twelve months.  But considering, after a fair, impartial, and competent investigation of the merits of the case (for all this is to be presumed), that the offended law would be satisfied with a suspension of three months, that punishment is decreed.  The court is adjourned sine die; for it has done all that is required—­the prisoner undergoes his sentence with becoming contrition, and the time having expired, the bond having been paid, and the debt satisfied, he is told that he must again undergo the ordeal of another trial, before another court, before he can reassume what was only taken from him for a definite period; and that it is still doubtful, whether the sentence of the former court may not even now, after its accomplishment, be reversed, and a new and more severe one be inflicted.