This looks as if Zialcita at least knew that something was to be done to draw the American fire.

Aguinaldo’s first statement relative to the opening of hostilities is embodied in a general order dated Malolos, February 4, 1899, and reads in part as follows:—­

“Nine o’clock P.M., this date, I received from Caloocan station a message communicated to me that the American forces, without prior notification or any just motive, attacked our camp at San Juan del Monte and our forces garrisoning the blockhouses around the outskirts of Manila, causing losses among our soldiers, who in view of this unexpected aggression and of the decided attack of the aggressors, were obliged to defend themselves until the firing became general all along the line.

“No one can deplore more than I this rupture of hostilities.  I have a clear conscience that I have endeavoured to avoid it at all costs, using all my efforts to preserve friendship with the army of occupation, even at the cost of not a few humiliations and many sacrificed rights.

* * * * *

“...  I order and command:—­

“1.  Peace and friendly relations between the Philippine forces and the American forces of occupation are broken, and the latter will be treated as enemies, with the limits prescribed by the laws of war.

“2.  American soldiers who may be captured by the Philippine forces will be treated as prisoners of war.

“3.  This proclamation shall be communicated to the accredited consuls of Manila, and to congress, in order that it may accord the suspension of the constitutional guarantees and the resulting declaration of war.” [229]

Aguinaldo’s protestations relative to his efforts to avoid hostilities are absurd, in view of his own instructions concerning the attack to be made simultaneously within and without the city of Manila.

There is other correspondence which throws light on the situation which existed immediately prior to the outbreak of hostilities.  On January 25, 1899, Agoncillo cabled from Washington to Apacible in Hongkong:  “Recommend you await beginning American aggression, justifying our conduct nations.” [230]

Apacible apparently did not take this view of the matter, for on January 31 he wrote to Aguinaldo that the Senate in Washington would take final vote upon the treaty of peace between the United States and Spain on February 6, and said:—­

“It is urgently necessary for America to answer us immediately before the ratification of the treaty.  A conflict after the ratification of the treaty would be unfavorable to us in public opinion.” [231]

Obviously this letter might be interpreted as a recommendation that hostilities begin before February 6 if America did not answer meanwhile.  It was evidently well understood in Hongkong that Aguinaldo’s receipt of Apacible’s letter might cause war to begin, for on February 3, 1899, Bray, anticipating the outbreak of hostilities of the following day, cabled Senator Hoar at Washington as follows:—­