General Otis’s account of the opening of active hostilities follows:—­

“On the night of February 2 they sent in a strong detachment to draw the fire of our outposts, which took up a position immediately in front and within a few yards of the same.  The outpost was strengthened by a few of our men, who silently bore their taunts and abuse the entire night.  This was reported to me by General MacArthur, whom I directed to communicate with the officer in command of the insurgent troops concerned.  His prepared letter was shown me and approved, and the reply received was all that could be desired.  However, the agreement was ignored by the insurgents and on the evening of February 4 another demonstration was made on one of our small outposts, which occupied a retired position at least 150 yards within the line which had been mutually agreed upon, an insurgent approaching the picket and refusing to halt or answer when challenged.  The result was that our picket discharged his piece, when the insurgent troops near Santa Mesa opened a spirited fire on our troops there stationed.

“The insurgents had thus succeeded in drawing the fire of a small outpost, which they had evidently labored with all their ingenuity to accomplish, in order to justify in some way their premeditated attack.  It is not believed that the chief insurgent leaders wished to open hostilities at this time, as they were not completely prepared to assume the initiative.  They desired two or three days more to perfect their arrangements, but the zeal of their army brought on the crisis which anticipated their premeditated action.  They could not have delayed long, however, for it was their object to force an issue before American troops, then en route, could arrive in Manila.” [227]

Thus began the Insurgent attack, so long and so carefully planned for.  We learn from the Insurgent records that the shot of the American sentry missed its mark.  There was no reason why it should have provoked a hot return fire, but it did.

The result of the ensuing combat was not at all what the Insurgents had anticipated.  The Americans did not drive very well.  It was but a short time before they themselves were routed and driven from their positions.

Aguinaldo of course promptly advanced the claim that his troops had been wantonly attacked.  The plain fact is that the Insurgent patrol in question deliberately drew the fire of the American sentry, and this was just as much an act of war as was the firing of the shot.  Whether the patrol was acting under proper orders from higher authority is not definitely known.

In this connection the following telegram sent by Captain Zialcita from Santa Ana on February 4, 1899, at 9.55 P.M., to Major Gray, San Juan del Monte, is highly interesting: 

“I received the telegram forwarded from Malolos.  General Ricarte is not here.  I believe (that if the) Americans open fire we shall attack.  Will ask instructions (of) Malolos.” [228]