Worse yet, information was sent to the Spaniards of the proposed American attack on the 13th instant, as is shown by the following letter:—­

“(Battalion of Cazadores, No. 2.  Expeditionary.  Office of the Lieutenant-Colonel.  Private.)

“Senor Don Artemio Ricarte:  [131]

“My Dear Sir:  I have received to-day your kind letter giving warning of the attack on Manila, and I thank you for your personal interest in me, which, on my part, I reciprocate.  I assure you that I am yours, most truly and sincerely,

“Luis Martinez Alcobendas.

“Singalon, August 10, 1898.” [132]

According to Taylor, this was not the first occurrence of this sort.  He says:—­

“The officers of the United States Army who believed that the insurgents were informing the Spaniards of the American movements were right.  Sastron has printed a letter from Pio del Pilar, dated July 30, to the Spanish officer commanding at Santa Ana, in which Pilar said that Aguinaldo had told him that the Americans would attack the Spanish lines on August 2 and advised that the Spaniards should not give way, but hold their positions.  Pilar added, however, that if the Spaniards should fall back on the walled city and surrender Santa Ana to himself, he would hold it with his own men.  Aguinaldo’s information was correct, and on August 2 eight American soldiers were killed or wounded by the Spanish fire.” [133]

Taylor continues:—­

“And yet Aguinaldo claimed to be an ally of the Americans.  It is not probable that these were the only two such letters written.  Aguinaldo had by this time found out that although he could defeat the scattered Spanish detachments, he could not defeat the Spanish force holding the lines of Manila.  He did not want the Americans in the Philippines.  They were in his way, and he had already made up his mind that if they did not give him what he wanted, he would drive them out by force.  He saw very early that it was extremely improbable that he should obtain from them what he wanted; accordingly all losses both among Spaniards and Americans would, from Aguinaldo’s point of view, inure to his benefit.  The best possible thing for him would be to hold his own force intact while they wore each other out.  The Spanish losses, small as they were, occurred in front of the American lines, not in front of the Filipinos.  There is no reason, accordingly, for believing that the Filipinos suffered heavily.  To arrange that the Spaniards should inflict losses upon the Americans, while he saved his own men, showed ingenuity on the part of Aguinaldo; but it was decidedly not the conduct of an ally.” [134]

The feeling toward the American troops at this time is further shown by a telegram from General Pio del Pilar, sent from San Pedro Macati on August 10, 1898:—­

“Commandant Acebedo writes that the Spaniards are about to surrender because they want to turn over the place; the Americans want them to leave only the batteries and say that they will station themselves in said batteries.  It appears that they want to deceive us; they do not want to give us arms, and if they do not give us arms, we shall attack them and drive them out.  I await your reply.” [135]