Obviously there was no real cooeperation between American and Filipino troops at this time.  General Anderson ignored General Aguinaldo’s request for information as to places where American troops were to land in Filipino territory and the objects of disembarking them.

The Americans proceeded with their plans for the attack upon Manila, and it became desirable to occupy some of the Insurgent trenches.  On July 29 Arevalo telegraphed Aguinaldo as follows:—­

“In conference with General Greene I asked for an official letter, a copy of which I send you:  ’Headquarters 2nd Brigade, U. S. Expeditionary Forces, Camp Dewey, near Manila, July 29th, 1898. El Senor Noriel, General de Brigade.  Sir:  In pursuance of our conversation of yesterday and the message which Captain Arevalo brought to me during the night, I beg to inform you that my troops will occupy the intrenchments between the Camino Real and the beach, leaving camp for that purpose at 8.00 o’clock this morning.  I will be obliged if you will give the necessary orders for the withdrawal of your men.  Thanking you for your courtesy, I remain, very respectfully, your obedient servant, F.  V. Greene, Brigadier General, commanding.’” [126]

This clear direct declaration of intention by General Greene is the actual transaction referred to by Blount as “Jockeying the Insurgents out of their trenches.”  He bases his statements concerning the matter on a newspaper report.

The attitude of the army officers in the matter of obtaining permission to occupy the trenches needed in preparing for the assault on the city could not have been more correct.

On August 10 General Merritt gave the following emphatic instructions relative to the matter:—­

“No rupture with Insurgents.  This is imperative.  Can ask Insurgent generals or Aguinaldo for permission to occupy their trenches, but if refused not to use force.”

On the same day General Anderson wrote to Aguinaldo, asking permission to occupy a trench facing blockhouse No. 14, in order to place artillery to destroy it.  The permission was granted on the following day.

During the early part of August, Aguinaldo seems to have avoided conferences with American officers.  On the second of the month Mabini wrote him how he had put off Admiral Dewey’s aid with a false statement that he did not know Aguinaldo’s whereabouts. [127]

The landing of American troops at Paranaque for the assault on Manila led to the concentration of Insurgent troops at the neighbouring town of Bacoor. [128]

On August 8 Fernando Acevedo [129] wrote to General Pio del Pilar that the Americans were going to attack the next day and that,—­

“It is requisite and necessary before their attack takes place to-morrow, that you to-morrow or to-night annihilate them, sparing none, for the way they have deceived us, and will again without fail, in the contract signed by Sr.  Emilio; and convince yourself, my friend, that it is necessary to do this; and when it is done the whole world will wonder and say that we have done well, and will not be able to give out that the people here are fools spending the time sucking their fingers.” [130]