Here, then, was a definite plan to obtain arms from the Americans to be used if necessary “against those very people” later.

“The President, with his prestige in the Philippines, would be able to arouse those masses to combat the demands of the United States, if they colonized that country, and would drive them, if circumstances rendered it necessary, to a Titanic struggle for their independence, even if they should succumb in shaking off the yoke of a new oppressor.  If Washington proposed to carry out the fundamental principles of its constitution, there was no doubt that it would not attempt to colonize the Philippines, or even to annex them.  It was probable then that it would give them independence and guarantee it; in such case the presence of the President was necessary, as he would prevent dissensions among the sons of the country who sought office, who might cause the intervention of European powers, an intervention which there was no reason to doubt would be highly prejudicial to the interests of the country....  What injury could come to the Philippines, even if we admitted that the Admiral would not give arms to the President on account of his refusal to sign a document prejudicial to the country, after he had taken all means to provide for her defence?  None.  Such an act of the President could not be censured, but, on the other hand, would be most meritorious, because it would be one proof more of his undoubted patriotism.”

Not one word of any promise of independence do we find in this remarkable document.  On the contrary it furnishes conclusive proof that no such promise had been made and that the future relations between Filipinos and Americans were still completely uncertain.

And now comes some direct evidence.  Bray and St. Clair, the latter the editor of the Insurgent organ in Singapore, were present on the occasion when independence was said to have been promised by Pratt.  Bray subsequently declared in the most positive terms that it was promised.  St. Clair wrote him a letter taking him roundly to task for this claim, in the following very interesting terms:—­

“I felt it to be my duty to let Pratt know that you still hold that you and Santos have evidence that will controvert his, (and) he was, of course, extremely disappointed, because he (is) quite aware of what took place in Spanish, and as to turning of his conversation into a pretense of agreement he knows nothing.  He says very truly:  ’My own party, the Democrats, will say if they read this book—­If this man takes it upon himself to be a Plenipotentiary without authority, we had better not employ him any more—­I frankly cannot understand your action, as to its unwisdom I have no doubt at all.’

“Admiral Dewey goes home, it is believed, to advise the President on Naval and Colonial Affairs, he knows exactly what did take place and what did not, and I should know if he had any ground to think that the slightest promise was made by Pratt to Aguinaldo he would declare it unauthorized and decline to sanction it.  I am certain Pratt reported what he supposed took place accurately; he had no surety on what you might have said, naturally.