These are by no means the only reasons why the revolution failed, but they foredoomed it to failure.

The surrender or capture of the more respectable military element left the unsurrendered firearms in the hands of men most of whom were ignorant, many of whom were criminal, and nearly all of whom were irresponsible and unscrupulous.

Strict enforcement of the rules of civilized warfare against them was threatened, but not actually resorted to.

The situation was particularly bad in Batangas.  General J. F. Bell was put in charge there, and he found a humane and satisfactory solution of the existing difficulties in reconcentration—­not the kind of reconcentration which made the Spaniards hated in Cuba, but a measure of a wholly different sort.  This measure and its results have been concisely described by Taylor, as follows:—­

“General Bell said he was as anxious as any one could be to avoid making war against those who really wanted the termination of hostilities, and it was his duty to protect them against the vengeance of others.  Over and above all these considerations in importance, however, was the absolute necessity of making it impossible for insurgents to procure food by levying contributions.  Therefore, in order to give those who were pacifically inclined an opportunity to escape hardship, as far as possible, and preserve their food supply for themselves and their families, it was determined to establish zones of protection with limits sufficiently near all towns to enable the small garrisons thereof to give the people living within these zones efficient protection against ruinous exactions by insurgents.  He accordingly, ’in order to put an end to enforced contributions now levied by insurgents upon the inhabitants of sparsely settled and outlying barrios and districts by means of intimidation and assassination,’ ordered the commanding officers of all towns in the provinces of Batangas and Laguna to ’immediately specify and establish plainly marked limits surrounding each town bounding a zone within which it may be practicable, with an average-sized garrison, to exercise sufficient supervision over and furnish protection to inhabitants (who desire to be peaceful) against the depredation of armed insurgents.  The limits may include the barrios which exist sufficiently near the town to be given protection and supervision by the garrison, and should include some ground on which live stock could graze, but so situated that it can be patrolled and watched.  All ungarrisoned towns will be garrisoned as soon as troops become available.

“’Commanding officers will also see that orders are at once given and distributed to all the inhabitants within the jurisdiction of towns over which they exercise supervision, informing them of the danger of remaining outside of these limits, and that unless they move by December 25 from outlying barrios and districts, with all their movable food supplies, including rice, palay, [427] chickens,