“Emilio Aguinaldo. [424]

“Manila, April 19, 1901.”

This announcement of Aguinaldo, published in Spanish, Tagalog and English, undoubtedly hastened the end of the war, but it did not lead to immediate general surrender, for as Taylor has very truly said:—­

“A force like Aguinaldo’s could not be surrendered.  It had been torn by internal dissensions and the bonds of discipline had always been very lax.  It had originally been held together by a lively expectation of the advantages to be obtained from the pillage of Manila.  That hope had disappeared, and the leaders had become the lords of life and property each in his own province.  It was a force which could disintegrate, but which could not surrender.  Only armies can do that.  Forces over which their leaders have lost all except nominal control when beaten do not surrender.  They disintegrate by passing through the stages of guerrilla warfare, of armed bands of highwaymen, of prowling groups of thieves, of sturdy beggars who at opportune moments resort to petty larceny.” [425]

Aguinaldo’s forces now passed through these several stages.  Some of his more important subordinates had previously been captured or had surrendered.  Others, still remaining in the field, now acted on his advice, more or less promptly.  A few remained obdurate for a time, but as a rule not for long, and soon there remained in the field only a very limited number of real military leaders, like General Malvar in Batangas and General Lukban in Samar, and a very considerable number of bandit chiefs, some of whom had posed as Insurgents.  The forces of the latter were now materially and rapidly augmented by men who had been Insurgent officers or soldiers and while serving in this capacity had become so enamoured of a lawless life that they were now unwilling to settle down and work for their daily bread, preferring to continue to live off their long-suffering fellow-countrymen, whom they robbed and murdered more mercilessly than ever.

The war was practically over.  The insurrection had failed.  In my opinion no Filipino who held out to the end for independence compared in intellectual power with Mabini, and I deem his views as to why it failed worthy of special attention.  At the time of his death, he left behind a memoir from which I quote the following:—­

“The revolution failed because it was poorly led, because its head conquered his place, not by meritorious, but by reprehensible actions, because in place of supporting the men most useful to the people, he rendered them useless because he was jealous of them.  Believing that the aggrandizement of the people was nothing more than his own personal aggrandizement, he did not judge the merits of men by their capacity, character, or patriotism, but by the degree of friendship and relationship which bound them to him; and wishing to have his favorites always ready to sacrifice themselves for him, he showed himself complaisant to their faults.  Having thus secured the people, the people deserted him.  And the people having deserted him, he had to fall like a wax idol melted by the heat of adversity.  God forbid that we should forget so terrible a lesson learned at the cost of unspeakable sufferings.” [426]