she declared black and white men to be equally free, and liberated the negroes of St. Domingo.  In Britain, the battle of social freedom has been fought chiefly by that religious sect which rests least on the letter of Scripture.  The bishops, and the more learned clergy, have consistently been apathetic to the duty of overthrowing the slave system.—­I was thus led to see, that here also the New Testament precepts must not be received by me as any final and authoritative law of morality.  But I meet opposition in a quarter from which I had least expected it;—­from one who admits the imperfection of the morality actually attained by the apostles, but avows that Christianity, as a divine system, is not to be identified with apostolic doctrine, but with the doctrine ultimately developed in the Christian Church; moreover, the ecclesiastical doctrine concerning slavery he alleges to be truer than mine,—­I mean, truer than that which I have expounded as held by modern abolitionists.  He approves of the principle of claiming freedom, not for men, but for Christians.  He says:  “That Christianity opened its arms at all to the servile class was enough; for in its embrace was the sure promise of emancipation....  Is it imputed as a disgrace, that Christianity put conversion before manumission, and brought them to God, ere it trusted them with themselves?...  It created the simultaneous obligation to make the Pagan a convert, and the convert free.” ...  “If our author had made his attack from the opposite side, and contended that its doctrines ‘proved too much’ against servitude, and assumed with too little qualification the capacity of each man for self-rule, we should have felt more hesitation in expressing our dissent.”

I feel unfeigned surprize at these sentiments from one whom I so highly esteem and admire; and considering that they were written at first anonymously, and perhaps under pressure of time, for a review, I hope it is not presumptuous in me to think it possible that they are hasty, and do not wholly express a deliberate and final judgment.  I must think there is some misunderstanding; for I have made no high claims about capacity for self-rule, as if laws and penalties were to be done away.  But the question is, shall human beings, who (as all of us) are imperfect, be controlled by public law, or by individual caprice?  Was not my reviewer intending to advocate some form of serfdom which is compatible with legal rights, and recognizes the serf as a man; not slavery which pronounces him a chattel?  Serfdom and apprenticeship we may perhaps leave to be reasoned down by economists and administrators; slavery proper is what I attacked as essentially immoral.