at least as wrong as failure to punish or prosecute for theft or murder would now be.  To decline to fight a duel was, till quite recently, to place yourself outside the pale of gentlemen.  A reluctance to sacrifice herself on the funeral pile of her dead husband was, till the practice of Suttee was abolished by the British government, one of the most immoral traits which a Brahman widow could exhibit.  Now, have we any means of discriminating, and, if so, how do we discriminate, between those acts which are really, and those which are only reputed, right or wrong?  That there is great need of such a test, if it can be discovered, is plain.  The wide divergences of opinion on matters of conduct in different ages, in different countries, in different classes of society, and even amongst men of the same class In the same country and at the same time, shew at once the vast importance of ascertaining some common measure of actions, and that there is no uniform rule of right and wrong to be found in the human mind itself.  If there is such a rule, it must be derived from some external considerations, and, if there is no such rule, then morality must be, to a large extent, a matter of prejudice, fancy, and caprice.  Now I conceive that there is a simple mode of ascertaining whether there is any test of actions other than the merely subjective determinations of our own minds, or, in other words, whether there are any reasons or external considerations by which the mind guides itself in its decisions on matters of conduct.  Do our moral opinions merely vary, or do they grow?  Is there any progress to be traced in morality, or does it simply oscillate, within certain limits, round a fixed point?  If some ‘simple’ and ‘innate’ idea of right, or some universal sense, were the test of morality, then we might expect that the moral decisions of all men would be uniform, or, at least, approximately uniform; if, on the other hand, there were no test at all, or, what amounts to much the same thing, a merely personal test, then we might expect that the moral judgments of mankind would vary arbitrarily according to the disposition and temperament of each individual man.  But, if there be a test derived from external considerations and capable of being applied to particular cases by the ordinary processes of reasoning, then we may fairly expect that, as the opportunities of observation and experience increase, the test will be applied more widely and more accurately, and that the science of conduct will grow, like all other sciences, with the advance of knowledge and of general civilisation.  Now, what, as a mutter of fact, has been the case?  Can anyone affect to doubt that the morality of civilized countries is far higher and purer, and far better adapted to secure the preservation and progress of society, than the customs of savage or barbaric tribes?  Or, however enamoured a man may be of classical antiquity, is there any one who would be prepared to change the ethical code and the prevailing ethical sentiment of