rule, as where it is desirable to encourage particular services, or particular nationalities, or the like, but, even in these cases, the rule of superior competency ought to be the preponderating consideration.  Parliamentary and, in a lesser degree, municipal elections, of course, form a class apart.  Here, in the selection of candidates within the party, superior competency ought to be the guiding consideration, but, in the election itself, the main object being to promote or prevent the passing of certain public measures, the elector quite rightly votes for those who will give effect to his opinions, irrespectively of personal qualifications, though, even in these cases, there might be an amount of unfitness which would warrant neutrality or opposition.  Peculiarly perplexing cases of competition between the rival claims of others sometimes occur in the domain of the resentful feelings, which, in their purified and rationalised form, constitute the sense of justice.  My servant, or a friend, or a relative, has committed a theft.  Shall I prosecute him?  A general regard to the public welfare undoubtedly demands that I should do so.  There are few obligations more imperative on the individual citizen than that of denouncing and prosecuting crime.  But, in the present case, there is the personal tie, involving the obligation of protection and assistance.  This tie, obviously, must count for something, as a rival consideration.  No man, except under the most extreme circumstances, would prosecute his wife, or his father, or his mother.  The question, then, is how far this consideration is to count against the other, and much must, evidently, depend on the degree of relationship or of previous intimacy, the time and amount and kind of service, and the like.  A similar conflict of motives arises when the punishment invoked would entail the culprit’s ruin, or that of his wife or family or others who are dependent upon him.  It is impossible, in cases of this kind, to lay down beforehand any strict rules of conduct, and the rectitude of the decision must largely turn on the experience, skill, and honesty of the person who attempts to resolve the difficulty.

Instances of the last division, where the conflict is between the pleasure or advantage of others and a disproportionate injury to oneself, are of comparatively infrequent occurrence.  It is not often that a man hesitates sufficiently between his own manifest disadvantage and the small gains or pleasures of his neighbours to make this class of cases of much importance to the moralist.  As a rule, we may be trusted to take care of ourselves, and other people credit us sufficiently with this capacity not to trade very much upon the weakness of mere good-nature, however much they may trade upon our ignorance and folly.  The most familiar example, perhaps, of acts of imprudence of the kind here contemplated is to be found in the facility with which some people yield to social temptations, as where they drink too much, or bet, or play cards,