To begin with the first division of my subject, How is morality, properly so called, discriminated from other sanctions of conduct?  By a sanction I may premise that I mean any pleasure which attracts to as well as any pain which deters from a given course of action.  In books on Jurisprudence, this word is usually employed to designate merely pains or penalties, but this circumstance arises from the fact that, at least in modern times, the law seldom has recourse to rewards, and effects its ends almost exclusively by means of punishments.  When we are considering conduct, however, in its general aspects and not exclusively in its relations to law, we appear to need a word to express any inducement, whether of a pleasureable or painful nature, which may influence a man’s actions, and such a word the term ‘sanction’ seems conveniently to supply.  Taking the word in this extended sense, the sanctions of conduct may be enumerated as the physical, the legal, the social, the religious, and the moral.  Of the physical sanction familiar examples may be found in the headache from which a man suffers after a night’s debauch, the pleasure of relaxation which awaits a well-earned holiday, the danger to life or limb which is attendant on reckless exercise, or the glow of constant satisfaction which rewards a healthy habit of life.  These pleasures and pains, when once experienced, exercise, for the future, an attracting or a deterring influence, as the case may be, on the courses of conduct with which they have respectively become associated.  Thus, a man who has once suffered from a severe headache, after a night’s drinking-bout, will be likely to exercise more discretion in future, or the prospect of agreeable diversion, at the end of a hard day’s work, will quicken a man’s efforts to execute his task.

The legal sanction is too familiar to need illustration.  Without penal laws, no society of any size could exist for a day.  There are, however, two characteristics of this sanction which it is important to point out.  One is that it works almost exclusively[1] by means of penalties.  It would be an endless and thankless business, in a society of any size, even if it were possible, to attempt to reward the virtuous for their consideration in not breaking the laws.  The cheap, the effective, indeed, in most cases, the only possible method is to punish the transgressor.  By a carefully devised and properly graduated system of penalties each citizen is thus furnished with the strongest inducement to refrain from those acts which may injure or annoy his neighbour.  Another characteristic of the legal sanction is that, though it is professedly addressed to all citizens alike, it actually affects the uneducated and lower classes far more than the educated and higher classes of society.  This circumstance arises partly from the fact that persons in a comfortable position of life are under little temptation to commit the more ordinary crimes forbidden