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No. 177.  Saturday, September 22, 1711.  Addison.

      ’...  Quis enim bonus, aut face dignus
      Arcana, qualem Cereris vult esse sacerdos,
      Ulla aliena sibi credat mala?’

      Juv.

In one of my last Week’s Papers I treated of Good-Nature, as it is the Effect of Constitution; I shall now speak of it as it is a Moral Virtue.  The first may make a Man easy in himself and agreeable to others, but implies no Merit in him that is possessed of it.  A Man is no more to be praised upon this Account, than because he has a regular Pulse or a good Digestion.  This Good-Nature however in the Constitution, which Mr. Dryden somewhere calls a Milkiness of Blood, [1] is an admirable Groundwork for the other.  In order therefore to try our Good-Nature, whether it arises from the Body or the Mind, whether it be founded in the Animal or Rational Part of our Nature; in a word, whether it be such as is entituled to any other Reward, besides that secret Satisfaction and Contentment of Mind which is essential to it, and the kind Reception it procures us in the World, we must examine it by the following Rules.

First, whether it acts with Steadiness and Uniformity in Sickness and in Health, in Prosperity and in Adversity; if otherwise, it is to be looked upon as nothing else but an Irradiation of the Mind from some new Supply of Spirits, or a more kindly Circulation of the Blood. Sir Francis Bacon mentions a cunning Solicitor, [who [2]] would never ask a Favour of a great Man before Dinner; but took care to prefer his Petition at a Time when the Party petitioned had his Mind free from Care, and his Appetites in good Humour.  Such a transient temporary Good-Nature as this, is not that Philanthropy, that Love of Mankind, which deserves the Title of a Moral Virtue.

The next way of a Man’s bringing his Good-Nature to the Test, is, to consider whether it operates according to the Rules of Reason and Duty:  For if, notwithstanding its general Benevolence to Mankind, it makes no Distinction between its Objects, if it exerts it self promiscuously towards the Deserving and Undeserving, if it relieves alike the Idle and the Indigent, if it gives it self up to the first Petitioner, and lights upon any one rather by Accident than Choice, it may pass for an amiable Instinct, but must not assume the Name of a Moral Virtue.

The third Tryal of Good-Nature will be, the examining ourselves, whether or no we are able to exert it to our own Disadvantage, and employ it on proper Objects, notwithstanding any little Pain, Want, or Inconvenience which may arise to our selves from it:  In a Word, whether we are willing to risque any Part of our Fortune, our Reputation, our Health or Ease, for the Benefit of Mankind.  Among all these Expressions of Good-Nature, I shall single out that which goes under the general Name of Charity, as it consists in relieving the Indigent; that being a Tryal of this Kind which offers itself to us almost at all Times and in every Place.