his firelock with him, but confessed that he had never fired it off, as he was unable to do so.  The piece, upon being examined, was found to be in perfect order.  Such poor undisciplined lads, fresh from the plough, ought never on any occasion to have been pitted against the well-drilled soldiers of Russia; but it was something worse than blundering to lead them on to the assault of a formidable work like the Redan.  Such generalship recalls to our mind the remark of the Russian officer with regard to the military force of England, that ’it was an army of lions led by donkeys.’” Mr. Russell states that many of these recruits “had only been enlisted a few days, and had never fired a rifle in their lives.”

Now will it be believed that General Codrington, to whom was committed the planning and directing of this ill-starred and disastrous enterprise, succeeded Sir James Simpson as Commander-in-Chief of Her Majesty’s forces in the Crimea?  How must the shade of Admiral Byng have haunted Her Majesty’s Government, unless it was a most forgiving ghost!  If General Codrington’s promotion could have been delayed a little more than eighteen months, it might have occurred appropriately on the centennial anniversary of the death of that ill-fated naval commander, convicted by court-martial and shot for “not doing his utmost”!

On the evening of the 8th of September, the Russians blew up their magazines, fired the buildings, and evacuated the town.  So fell Sebastopol, after a siege of three hundred and forty-five days.  It has been considered by the English a bit of very choice pleasantry to allude to our oft-recurring statement, that “the decisive blow had been struck,” and that “the backbone of the Rebellion was broken.”  It may not be impertinent to remind them, that the report, first circulated in France and England in the latter part of September, 1854, and fortified by minute details, that Sebastopol—­the backbone of Russian resistance to the allied arms—­had fallen, was repeated and reiterated from time to time during the war, until the phrase, “Sebastopol est pris,” passed into a by-word, and did good service in relieving the cruelly overworked Greek Kalends.

And now we come naturally to the consideration of another and an important inquiry.  Did the beginning of the war find, or did its progress develop or create, a single English general of commanding military capacity, competent to handle in the field even so small an army as the British contingent in the Crimea?  Of Lord Raglan Mr. Russell says, and without doubt says truly,—­“That he was a great chief, or even a moderately able general, I have every reason to doubt, and I look in vain for any proof of it, whilst he commanded the English army in the Crimea.”  Another authority says,—­“The conviction that he was not a great general is universal and uncontradicted.  He could perform the ordinary duties of a general satisfactorily, but he was lamentably deficient in