“I know not what may have been the feelings of your home public, on reading the telegraphic news of our defeat, (for I presume the scribes at head-quarters made no attempt to conceal the naked truth, that our repulse was neither more nor less than a defeat,) but here mingled shame and indignation were general throughout the camp.  Officers and men alike felt that disgrace had been incurred, and that solely in consequence of the unredeemed mismanagement of their generals.  Remembering the confusion which characterized the commencement of our movement, and coupling this with the murderous preparations made by the enemy, you will be at no loss to understand that success was most improbable.  During the whole affair, Lord Raglan and Sir George Brown were ensconced within our eight-gun battery; but, though this afforded a good view of the scene of the struggle, and of the disorders which marked it, they appeared to be unable to give any efficient directions for the correction of our multiplied blunders.  When the whole sad scene was ended, our men straggled back to the camp in a state of dispirited confusion, well in keeping with the mob-like disorder in which they had been throughout the assault.”

The final bombardment of Sebastopol took place on the 5th of September, followed on the 8th by the renewed assault of the French on the Malakhoff and of the English on the Redan.  Skilful generalship, adequate forces, and desperate bravery gave victory to the French, and “the key to Sebastopol” remained in their hands.  Meanwhile the English assault upon the Redan was repulsed with frightful sacrifice of life.  It will not be contended that the French owed any part of their success to superior good-fortune.  Indeed, all the extrinsic advantages were on the side of the English.  The French were to lead off in the assault, and the tricolor waving over the captured fortification was to be the signal for the advance of the English.  If the French succeeded, every sentiment of personal ambition and national pride would stimulate their allies to achieve an equal victory.  If the French failed, the English had only to remain in their trenches.

Now let us examine the comparative generalship displayed in the two assaults.  We are quite willing that English authority should draw the contrast.  “The preparations of the French were actually scientific in their vigorous attention to every matter calculated to lead to victory:  nothing appeared to have been forgotten, nothing neglected.  Even the watches of the leading officers had been regulated, that there might not be the smallest error with regard to time.  It is a painful reflection that this carefulness of preparation, and prescience with respect to probabilities, was not shown by the English general and his associates in arranging the mode of attack.  When the orders were promulgated, on the 7th, many officers shook their heads doubtingly, and observed, in deprecating tones, ‘This looks like another 18th of June.’  It was generally observed that the attacking columns were not strong enough, that they were too far behind, and that the trenches did not afford room for a sufficient number of men.”