The Atlantic Monthly, Volume 11, No. 66, April, 1863 eBook

This eBook from the Gutenberg Project consists of approximately 305 pages of information about The Atlantic Monthly, Volume 11, No. 66, April, 1863.

The Atlantic Monthly, Volume 11, No. 66, April, 1863 eBook

This eBook from the Gutenberg Project consists of approximately 305 pages of information about The Atlantic Monthly, Volume 11, No. 66, April, 1863.

Then came the Battle of Inkerman, a gallant and desperate sortie of the Russians, bravely and successfully resisted by the besiegers.  The loss of life on both sides was terrible.  To what extent was this battle decisive?  Mr. Russell shall give his own testimony on this point:—­“We had nothing to rejoice over, and almost everything to deplore, in the Battle of Inkerman.  We defeated the enemy, indeed, but had not advanced one step nearer the citadel of Sebastopol.”  In other words, the Allies had repulsed the Russians, but had barely escaped annihilation, while, from having been the besiegers, they became the besieged, and remained so until largely reinforced from home.  “A heavy responsibility,” says Mr. Russell, “rests on those whose neglect enabled the enemy to attack us where we were least prepared for it, and whose indifference led them to despise precautions which, taken in time, might have saved us many valuable lives, and have trebled the loss of the enemy.”  The English not only committed the serious error of underrating the enemy, and neglecting the most ordinary precautions against surprise, but, during the whole of the desperate and bloody fight, they gave no proof whatever of generalship.  The stubborn, unyielding bravery of the troops was the salvation of the army.  “We owed the victory, such as it was, to strength, not to superior intelligence and foresight.  It was a soldiers’ battle, in which we were saved by the muscle, nerve, and courage of our men.”  Humanity shudders and the heart sickens over the sufferings of that gallant army of martyrs to cabinet incapacity and military imbecility during the long and dreary winter of 1854-55.

On the 9th of April, 1855, commenced the second grand bombardment of Sebastopol, which, though continuing for twelve days, resulted, like the first, in mortifying failure, no serious or irreparable injuries being caused to the main defences of the enemy.  “The real strength of the place remained unimpaired.  That which was injured during the day the Russians repaired as if by magic during the night.  The particulars of this twelve days’ bombardment are wearisome.  The same wasted energy, the same night-skirmishes without effect, the same battering and repairing, the same unwearied exertions On the part of the Allies and wonderful endurance and resistance on the part of the Russians, together with, on each side, the same loss of life and frightful mutilations.”

Two months were passed in comparative inaction, the sad monotony being varied only by ineffective sorties and indecisive skirmishes.  On the 18th of June, the first grand assault of the Malakhoff and Redan was attempted.  The allied troops displayed the utmost gallantry, and did all that brave men could do under disgracefully incompetent commanders, but were repulsed with horrible slaughter.  No one can read the details of the fruitless massacre, without fully confirming the indignant testimony of an intelligent eye-witness, writing from the camp:—­

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The Atlantic Monthly, Volume 11, No. 66, April, 1863 from Project Gutenberg. Public domain.