He was Chief of the War Staff at the Admiralty in the early stages of the war, which means, I take it, that he assisted in planning the moves on the chessboard.  It fell to him to act; to apply the strategy and tactics which he planned for others at sea while he sat at a desk.  It was his wit against von Spee’s, who was not deficient in this respect.  If he had been he might not have steamed into the trap.  The trouble was that von Spee had some wit, but not enough.  It would have been better for him if he had been as guileless as a parson.

Sir Frederick is so gentle-mannered that one would never suspect him of a “double bluff,” which was what he played on von Spee.  After von Spee’s victory over Cradock, Sturdee slipped across to the South Atlantic, without anyone knowing that he had gone, with a squadron strong enough to do unto von Spee what von Spee had done unto Cradock.

But before you wing your bird you must flush him.  The thing was to find von Spee and force him to give battle; for the South Atlantic is broad and von Spee, it is supposed, was in an Emden mood and bent on reaching harbour in German South-West Africa, whence he could sally out to destroy British shipping on the Cape route.  When he intercepted a British wireless message—­Sturdee had left off the sender’s name and location—­telling the plodding old Canopus seeking home or assistance before von Spee overtook her, that she would be perfectly safe in the harbour at Port William, as guns had been erected for her protection, von Spee guessed that this was a bluff, and rightly.  But it was only Bluff Number One.  He steamed to the Falklands with a view to finishing off the old Canopus on the way across to Africa.  There he fell foul of Bluff Number Two.  Sturdee did not have to seek him; he came to Sturdee.

There was no convenient Dogger Bank fog in that latitude to cover his flight.  Sturdee had the speed of von Spee and he had to fight.  It was the one bit of strategy of the war which is like that of the story books and worked out as strategy always does in proper story books.  Practically the twelve-inch guns of the Inflexible and the Invincible had only to keep their distance and hang on to the Scharnhorst and the Gneisenau in order to do the trick.  Light-weights or middle-weights have no business trafficking with heavy-weights in naval warfare.

“Von Spee made a brave fight,” said Sir Frederick, “but we kept him at a distance that suited us, without letting him get out of range.”

He had had the fortune to prove an established principle in action.  It was all in the course of duty, which is the way that all the officers and all the men look at their work.  Only a few ships have had a chance to fight, and these are emblazoned on the public memory.  But they did no better and no worse, probably, than the others would have done.  If the public singles out ships, the navy does not.  Whatever is done and whoever does it, why, it is to the credit of the family, according to the spirit of service that promotes uniformity of efficiency.  Leaders and ships which have won renown are resolved into the whole in that harbour where the fleet is the thing; and the good opinion they most desire is that of their fellows.  If they have that they will earn the public’s when the test comes.