It is to be supposed, that, at this time, the vigour of the criminal laws is much relaxed, and their execution difficult.  The army offers refuge and impunity to guilt of all kinds, and the magistrates themselves would be apprehensive of pursuing an offender who was protected by the mob, or, which is the same thing, by the Jacobins.

The groundwork of much of the French civil jurisprudence is arbitration, particularly in those trifling processes which originate in a spirit of litigation; and it is not easy for a man here, however well disposed, to spend twenty pounds in a contest about as many pence, or to ruin himself in order to secure the possession of half an acre of land.  In general, redress is easily obtained without unnecessary procrastination, and with little or no cost.  Perhaps most legal codes may be simple and efficacious at their first institution, and the circumstance of their being encumbered with forms which render them complex and expensive, may be the natural consequence of length of time and change of manners.  Littleton might require no commentary in the reign of Henry II. and the mysterious fictions that constitute the science of modern judicature were perhaps familiar, and even necessary, to our ancestors.  It is to be regretted that we cannot adapt our laws to the age in which we live, and assimilate them to our customs; but the tendency of our nature to extremes perpetuates evils, and makes both the wise and the timid enemies to reform.  We fear, like John Calvin, to tear the habit while we are stripping off the superfluous decoration; and the example of this country will probably long act as a discouragement to all change, either judicial or political.  The very name of France will repress the desire of innovation—­we shall cling to abuses as though they were our support, and every attempt to remedy them will become an objection of suspicion and terror.—­Such are the advantages which mankind will derive from the French revolution.

The Jacobin constitution is now finished, and, as far as I am able to judge, it is what might be expected from such an origin:  calculated to flatter the people with an imaginary sovereignty—­to place the whole power of election in the class most easily misled—­to exclude from the representation those who have a natural interest in the welfare of the country, and to establish the reign of anarchy and intrigue.—­Yet, however averse the greater number of the French may be from such a constitution, no town or district has dared to reject it; and I remark, that amongst those who have been foremost in offering their acceptation, are many of the places most notoriously aristocratic.  I have enquired of some of the inhabitants of these very zealous towns on what principle they acted so much in opposition to their known sentiments:  the reply is always, that they fear the vengeance of the Jacobins, and that they are awed by military force.  This reasoning is, of course, unanswerable; and we learn, from the debates of the Convention, that the people have received the new constitution "avec la plus vive reconnoissance," ["With the most lively gratitude.”] and that they have all sworn to die in its defence.—­Yours, &c.