I said awhile back (p. 381) that I should return to the ‘metaphysical’ question before ending; so, with a few words about that, I will now close my remarks.

In whatever form we hear this question propounded, I think that it always arises from two things, a belief that causality must be exerted in activity, and a wonder as to how causality is made.  If we take an activity-situation at its face-value, it seems as if we caught in flagrante delicto the very power that makes facts come and be.  I now am eagerly striving, for example, to get this truth which I seem half to perceive, into words which shall make it show more clearly.  If the words come, it will seem as if the striving itself had drawn or pulled them into actuality out from the state of merely possible being in which they were.  How is this feat performed?  How does the pulling pull?  How do I get my hold on words not yet existent, and when they come, by what means have I made them come?  Really it is the problem of creation; for in the end the question is:  How do I make them be? Real activities are those that really make things be, without which the things are not, and with which they are there.  Activity, so far as we merely feel it, on the other hand, is only an impression of ours, it may be maintained; and an impression is, for all this way of thinking, only a shadow of another fact.

Arrived at this point, I can do little more than indicate the principles on which, as it seems to me, a radically empirical philosophy is obliged to rely in handling such a dispute.

If there be real creative activities in being, radical empiricism must say, somewhere they must be immediately lived.  Somewhere the that of efficacious causing and the what of it must be experienced in one, just as the what and the that of ‘cold’ are experienced in one whenever a man has the sensation of cold here and now.  It boots not to say that our sensations are fallible.  They are indeed; but to see the thermometer contradict us when we say ‘it is cold’ does not abolish cold as a specific nature from the universe.  Cold is in the arctic circle if not here.  Even so, to feel that our train is moving when the train beside our window moves, to see the moon through a telescope come twice as near, or to see two pictures as one solid when we look through a stereoscope at them, leaves motion, nearness, and solidity still in being—­if not here, yet each in its proper seat elsewhere.  And wherever the seat of real causality is, as ultimately known ’for true’ (in nerve-processes, if you will, that cause our feelings of activity as well as the movements which these seem to prompt), a philosophy of pure experience can consider the real causation as no other nature of thing than that which even in our most erroneous experiences appears to be at work.  Exactly what appears there is what we mean by working, tho we may later come to learn that working was not exactly there.  Sustaining, persevering, striving, paying with effort as we go, hanging on, and finally achieving our intention—­this is action, this is effectuation in the only shape in which, by a pure experience-philosophy, the whereabouts of it anywhere can be discussed.  Here is creation in its first intention, here is causality at work.[1] To treat this offhand as the bare illusory