sich nicht der geringste beweis fuer das vorhandensein einer psychischen taetigkeit’ (Muensterberg:  Grundzuege, etc., p. 67).  I could multiply similar quotations, and would have introduced some of them into my text to make it more concrete, save that the mingling of different points of view in most of these author’s discussions (not in Muensterberg’s) make it impossible to disentangle exactly what they mean.  I am sure in any case to be accused of misrepresenting them totally, even in this note, by omission of the context, so the less I name names and the more I stick to abstract characterization of a merely possible style of opinion, the safer it will be.  And apropos of misunderstandings, I may add to this note a complaint on my own account.  Professor Stout, in the excellent chapter on ‘Mental Activity,’ in vol. i of his Analytic Psychology, takes me to task for identifying spiritual activity with certain muscular feelings, and gives quotations to bear him out.  They are from certain paragraphs on ‘the Self,’ in which my attempt was to show what the central nucleus of the activities that we call ‘ours’ is.  I found it in certain intracephalic movements which we habitually oppose, as ‘subjective,’ to the activities of the transcorporeal world.  I sought to show that there is no direct evidence that we feel the activity of an inner spiritual agent as such (I should now say the activity of ‘consciousness’ as such, see my paper ’Does consciousness exist?’ in the Journal of Philosophy, vol. i, p. 477).  There are, in fact, three distinguishable ‘activities’ in the field of discussion:  the elementary activity involved in the mere that of experience, in the fact that something is going on, and the farther specification of this something into two whats, an activity felt as ‘ours,’ and an activity ascribed to objects.  Stout, as I apprehend him, identifies ‘our’ activity with that of the total experience-process, and when I circumscribe it as a part thereof, accuses me of treating it as a sort of external appendage to itself (pp. 162-163), as if I ’separated the activity from the process which is active.’  But all the processes in question are active, and their activity is inseparable from their being.  My book raised only the question of which activity deserved the name of ‘ours.’  So far as we are ‘persons,’ and contrasted and opposed to an ‘environment,’ movements in our body figure as our activities; and I am unable to find any other activities that are ours in this strictly personal sense.  There is a wider sense in which the whole ‘choir of heaven and furniture of the earth,’ and their activities, are ours, for they are our ‘objects.’  But ‘we’ are here only another name for the total process of experience, another name for all that is, in fact; and I was dealing with the personal and individualized self exclusively in the passages with which Professor Stout finds fault.