Note 11, page 121.—­Studies in the Hegelian Dialectic, secs. 150, 153.

Note 12, page 121.—­The Nature of Truth, 1906, pp. 170-171.

Note 13, page 121.—­Ibid., p. 179.

Note 14, page 123.—­The psychological analogy that certain finite tracts of consciousness are composed of isolable parts added together, cannot be used by absolutists as proof that such parts are essential elements of all consciousness.  Other finite fields of consciousness seem in point of fact not to be similarly resolvable into isolable parts.

Note 15, page 128.—­Judging by the analogy of the relation which our central consciousness seems to bear to that of our spinal cord, lower ganglia, etc., it would seem natural to suppose that in whatever superhuman mental synthesis there may be, the neglect and elimination of certain contents of which we are conscious on the human level might be as characteristic a feature as is the combination and interweaving of other human contents.

LECTURE IV

Note 1, page 143.—­The Spirit of Modern Philosophy, p. 227.

Note 2, page 165.—­Fechner:  Ueber die Seelenfrage, 1861, p. 170.

Note 3, page 168.—­Fechner’s latest summarizing of his views, Die Tagesansicht gegenueber der Nachtansicht, Leipzig, 1879, is now, I understand, in process of translation.  His Little Book of Life after Death exists already in two American versions, one published by Little, Brown & Co., Boston, the other by the Open Court Co., Chicago.

Note 4, page 176.—­Mr. Bradley ought to be to some degree exempted from my attack in these last pages.  Compare especially what he says of non-human consciousness in his Appearance and Reality, pp. 269-272.

LECTURE V

Note 1, page 182.—­Royce:  The Spirit of Modern Philosophy, p. 379.

Note 2, page 184.—­The World and the Individual, vol. ii, pp. 58-62.

Note 3, page 190.—­I hold to it still as the best description of an enormous number of our higher fields of consciousness.  They demonstrably do not contain the lower states that know the same objects.  Of other fields, however this is not so true; so, in the Psychological Review for 1895, vol. ii, p. 105 (see especially pp. 119-120), I frankly withdrew, in principle, my former objection to talking of fields of consciousness being made of simpler ‘parts,’ leaving the facts to decide the question in each special case.

Note 4, page 194.—­I abstract from the consciousness attached to the whole itself, if such consciousness be there.

LECTURE VI

Note 1, page 250.—­For a more explicit vindication of the notion of activity, see Appendix B, where I try to defend its recognition as a definite form of immediate experience against its rationalistic critics.