LECTURE II

Note 1, page 50.—­The difference is that the bad parts of this finite are eternal and essential for absolutists, whereas pluralists may hope that they will eventually get sloughed off and become as if they had not been.

Note 2, page 51.—­Quoted by W. Wallace:  Lectures and Essays, Oxford, 1898, p. 560.

Note 3, page 51.—­Logic, tr.  Wallace, 1874, p. 181.

Note 4, page 52.—­Ibid., p. 304.

Note 5, page 53.—­Contemporary Review, December, 1907, vol. 92, p. 618.

Note 6, page 57.—­Metaphysic, sec. 69 ff.

Note 7, page 62.—­The World and the Individual, vol. i, pp. 131-132.

Note 8, page 67.—­A good illustration of this is to be found in a controversy between Mr. Bradley and the present writer, in Mind for 1893, Mr. Bradley contending (if I understood him rightly) that ‘resemblance’ is an illegitimate category, because it admits of degrees, and that the only real relations in comparison are absolute identity and absolute non-comparability.

Note 9, page 75.—­Studies in the Hegelian Dialectic, p. 184.

Note 10, page 75.—­Appearance and Reality, 1893, pp. 141-142.

Note 11, page 76.—­Cf. Elements of Metaphysics, p. 88.

Note 12, page 77.—­Some Dogmas of Religion, p. 184.

Note 13, page 80.—­For a more detailed criticism of Mr. Bradley’s intellectualism, see Appendix A.

LECTURE III

Note 1, page 94.—­Hegel, Smaller Logic, pp. 184-185.

Note 2, page 95.—­Cf.  Hegel’s fine vindication of this function of contradiction in his Wissenschaft der Logik, Bk. ii, sec. 1, chap, ii, C, Anmerkung 3.

Note 3, page 95—­Hegel, in Blackwood’s Philosophical Classics, p. 162.

Note 4, page 95—­Wissenschaft der Logik, Bk. i, sec. 1, chap, ii, B, a.

Note 5, page 96—­Wallace’s translation of the Smaller Logic, p. 128.

Note 6, page 101—­Joachim, The Nature of Truth, Oxford, 1906, pp. 22, 178.  The argument in case the belief should be doubted would be the higher synthetic idea:  if two truths were possible, the duality of that possibility would itself be the one truth that would unite them.

Note 7, page 115.—­The World and the Individual, vol. ii, pp. 385, 386, 409.

Note 8, page 116.—­The best uninspired argument (again not ironical!) which I know is that in Miss M.W.  Calkins’s excellent book, The Persistent Problems of Philosophy, Macmillan, 1902.

Note 9, page 117.—­Cf.  Dr. Fuller’s excellent article,’ Ethical monism and the problem of evil,’ in the Harvard Journal of Theology, vol. i, No. 2, April, 1908.

Note 10, page 120.—­Metaphysic, sec. 79.