Compromise and mediation are inseparable from the pluralistic philosophy.  Only monistic dogmatism can say of any of its hypotheses, ‘It is either that or nothing; take it or leave it just as it stands.’  The type of monism prevalent at Oxford has kept this steep and brittle attitude, partly through the proverbial academic preference for thin and elegant logical solutions, partly from a mistaken notion that the only solidly grounded basis for religion was along those lines.  If Oxford men could be ignorant of anything, it might almost seem that they had remained ignorant of the great empirical movement towards a pluralistic panpsychic view of the universe, into which our own generation has been drawn, and which threatens to short-circuit their methods entirely and become their religious rival unless they are willing to make themselves its allies.  Yet, wedded as they seem to be to the logical machinery and technical apparatus of absolutism, I cannot but believe that their fidelity to the religious ideal in general is deeper still.  Especially do I find it hard to believe that the more clerical adherents of the school would hold so fast to its particular machinery if only they could be made to think that religion could be secured in some other way.  Let empiricism once become associated with religion, as hitherto, through some strange misunderstanding, it has been associated with irreligion, and I believe that a new era of religion as well as of philosophy will be ready to begin.  That great awakening of a new popular interest in philosophy, which is so striking a phenomenon at the present day in all countries, is undoubtedly due in part to religious demands.  As the authority of past tradition tends more and more to crumble, men naturally turn a wistful ear to the authority of reason or to the evidence of present fact.  They will assuredly not be disappointed if they open their minds to what the thicker and more radical empiricism has to say.  I fully believe that such an empiricism is a more natural ally than dialectics ever were, or can be, of the religious life.  It is true that superstitions and wild-growing over-beliefs of all sorts will undoubtedly begin to abound if the notion of higher consciousnesses enveloping ours, of fechnerian earth-souls and the like, grows orthodox and fashionable; still more will they superabound if science ever puts her approving stamp on the phenomena of which Frederic Myers so earnestly advocated the scientific recognition, the phenomena of psychic research so-called—­and I myself firmly believe that most of these phenomena are rooted in reality.  But ought one seriously to allow such a timid consideration as that to deter one from following the evident path of greatest religious promise?  Since when, in this mixed world, was any good thing given us in purest outline and isolation?  One of the chief characteristics of life is life’s redundancy.  The sole condition of our having anything, no matter what, is that we should have so much of it, that we are