after telling him what he meant to do, had added,
“I know through one of my servants that the French
have said that I retired from Provence shamefully.
I remained there a space of three months and eight
days, waiting for battle. I hope to give the
world to know that I have no fear of King Francis,
for, please God, we shall place ourselves so close
together that we shall have great trouble to get disentangled
without battle, and I shall so do that neither he nor
they who have held such talk about me shall say that
I was afraid of being there.” The situation
was from that moment changed. The French army
found themselves squeezed between the fortress which
would not surrender and the imperial army which was
coming to relieve it. Things, however, remained
stationary for three weeks. Francis I. intrenched
himself strongly in his camp, which the Imperialists
could not attack without great risk of unsuccess.
“Pavia is doomed to fall,” wrote Francis
to his mother the regent on the 3d of February, “if
they do not reenforce it somehow; and they are beating
about to make it hold on to the last gasp, which,
I think, will not be long now, for it is more than
a month since those inside have had no wine to drink
and neither meat nor cheese to eat; they are short
of powder even.” Antony de Leyva gave notice
to the Imperialists that the town was not in a condition
for further resistance. On the other hand, if
the imperial army put off fighting, they could not
help breaking up; they had exhausted their victuals,
and the leaders their money; they were keeping the
field without receiving pay, and were subsisting,
so to speak, without resources. The prudent Marquis
of Pescara himself was for bringing on a battle, which
was indispensable. “A hundred years in
the field,” said he, in the words of an old Italian
proverb, “are better than one day of fighting,
for one may lose in a doubtful melley what one was
certain of winning by skilful manoeuvres; but when
one can no longer keep the field, one must risk a battle,
so as not to give the enemy the victory without a
fight.” The same question was being discussed
in the French camp. The veteran captains, La
Tremoille and Chabannes, were of opinion that by remaining
in the strong position in which they were encamped
they would conquer without fighting. Bonnivet
and De Montmorency were of the contrary opinion.
“We French,” said Bonnivet, “have
not been wont to make war by means of military artifices,
but handsomely and openly, especially when we have
at our head a valiant king, who is enough to make
the veriest dastards fight. Our kings bring
victory with them, as our little king Charles VIII.
did at the Taro, our king Louis XII. at Agnadello,
and our king who is here present at Melegnano.”
Francis I. was not the man to hold out against such
sentiments and such precedents; and he decided to accept
battle as soon as it should be offered him.
The imperial leaders, at a council held on the 23d
of February, determined to offer it next day.
Bourbon vigorously supported the opinion of Pescara.