Louis XI. himself could demand no more.  Had they been more experienced and far-sighted, the states-general of 1468 would not have been disposed to resign, even temporarily, into the hands of the kingship, their rights and their part in the government of the country; but they showed patriotism and good sense in defending the integrity of the kingdom, national unity, and public order against the selfish ambition and disorderly violence of feudalism.

Fortified by their burst of attachment, Louis, by the treaty of Ancenis, signed on the 10th of September, 1468, put an end to his differences with Francis II., Duke of Brittany, who gave up his alliance with the house of Burgundy, and undertook to prevail upon Duke Charles of France to accept an arbitration for the purpose of settling, before two years were over, the question of his territorial appanage in the place of Normandy.  In the meanwhile a pension of sixty thousand livres was to be paid by the crown to that prince.  Thus Louis was left with the new duke, Charles of Burgundy, as the only adversary he had to face.  His advisers were divided as to the course to be taken with this formidable vassal.  Was he to be dealt with by war or by negotiation?  Count de Dampmartin, Marshal de Rouault, and nearly all the military men earnestly advised war.  “Leave it to us,” they said:  “we will give the king a good account of this Duke of Burgundy.  Plague upon it! what do these Burgundians mean?  They have called in the English and made alliance with them in order to give us battle; they have handed over the country to fire and sword; they have driven the king from his lordship.  We have suffered too much; we must have revenge; down upon them, in the name of the devil, down upon them.  The king makes a sheep of himself and bargains for his wool and his skin, as if he had not wherewithal to defend himself.  ’Sdeath! if we were in his place, we would rather risk the whole kingdom than let ourselves be treated in this fashion.”  But the king did not like to risk the kingdom; and he had more confidence in negotiation than in war.  Two of his principal advisers, the constable De St. Pol and the cardinal De la Balue, Bishop of Evreux, were of his opinion, and urged him to the top of his bent.  Of them he especially made use in his more or less secret relations with the Duke of Burgundy; and he charged them to sound him with respect to a personal interview between himself and the duke.  It has been very well remarked by M. de Barante, in his Histoire des Dues de Bourgogne, that “Louis had a great idea of the influence he gained over people by his wits and his language; he was always convinced that people never said what ought to be said, and that they did not set to work the right way.”  It was a certain way of pleasing him to give him promise of a success which he would owe to himself alone; and the constable and the cardinal did not fail to do so.  They found the Duke of Burgundy