some-times even going to his aid. He thus played
off the greater part of the undeclared attempts or
armed expeditions by which, from 1186 to 1189, Philip
tried to cut him short in his French possessions, and,
so long as Henry IL lived, there were but few changes
in the territorial proportions of the two states.
But, at Henry’s death, Philip found himself
in a very different position towards Henry’s
two sons, Richard Coeur de Lion and John Lackland.
They were of his own generation; he had been on terms
with them, even in opposition to their own father,
of complicity and familiarity: they had no authority
over him, and he had no respect for them. Richard
was the feudal prince, beyond comparison the boldest,
the most unreflecting, the most passionate, the most
ruffianly, the most heroic adventurer of the middle
ages, hungering after movement and action, possessed
of a craving spirit for displaying his strength, and
doing his pleasure at all times and in all places,
not only in contempt of the rights and well-being
of his subjects, but at the risk of his own safety,
his own power, and even of his crown. Philip
was of a sedate temperament, patient, persevering,
moved but little by the spirit of adventure, more
ambitious than fiery, capable of far-reaching designs,
and discreet at the same time that he was indifferent
as to the employment of means. He had fine sport
with Richard. We have already had the story
of the relations between them, and their rupture during
their joint crusade in the East. On returning
to the West, Philip did not wrest from King Richard
those great and definitive conquests which were to
restore to France the greater part of the marriage-portion
that went with Eleanor of Aquitaine; but he paved
the way for them by petty victories and petty acquisitions,
and by making more and more certain his superiority
over his rival. When, after Richard’s death,
he had to do with John Lackland, cowardly and insolent,
knavish and addle-pated, choleric, debauched, and
indolent, an intriguing subordinate on the throne
on which he made pretence to be the most despotic of
kings, Philip had over him, even more than over his
brother Richard, immense advantages. He made
such use of them that after six years’ struggling,
from 1199 to 1205, he deprived John of the greater
part of his French possessions, Anjou, Normandy, Touraine,
Maine, and Poitou. Philip would have been quite
willing to dispense with any legal procedure by way
of sanction to his conquests, but John furnished him
with an excellent pretext; for on the 3d of April,
1203, he assassinated with his own hand, in the tower
of Rouen, his young nephew Arthur, Duke of Brittany,
and in that capacity vassal of Philip Augustus, to
whom he was coming to do homage. Philip had
John, also his vassal, cited before the court of the
barons of France, his peers, to plead his defence of
this odious act. “King John,” says
the contemporary English historian Matthew Paris, “sent
Eustace, Bishop of Ely, to tell King Philip that he